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ABSTRACT 
 COVID-19 has impacted the DON’s readiness and ability to operate effectively, 
and this presents a potential security risk to the U.S. population. In order to allow 
employees to return to their normal working routines and prevent the spread of 
COVID-19, the DON began to procure and test a Bluetooth-based contact tracing system 
in 2020. This research explores the privacy considerations of a digital contact tracing 
system that was being procured by the DON, and it does so by applying the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Privacy Framework which was released in 
January 2020. We are not only able to provide recommendations about the privacy of the 
contact tracing system, but we are also able to assess the privacy framework as a privacy 
risk management tool. 
 We provide a privacy threat model of the system by analyzing the data path of the 
contact tracing system. We also apply the NIST Privacy Framework to our model of the 
system, and we determine that the framework is useful for risk identification but does 
very little to contribute to assessing the impact or likelihood of privacy risks. The threat 
modeling also reveals that the DON needs to focus more on disassociability of data sets 
when considering the privacy risks of the contact tracing system, and we recommend that 
the DON begin conducting privacy testing on systems that collect PII. Finally, we 
recommend combining the NIST Cybersecurity and Privacy Frameworks in order to 
streamline the assessment process. 
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Privacy surrounding digital data and use of technologies has been a topic of concern 
at the federal level in the United States for many decades, as evidenced by watershed events 
such as the enactment of the Privacy Act of 1974. As artificial intelligence (AI), machine 
learning (ML), and big data analytics continue to advance, digital privacy and privacy-
preserving technologies have become ever more prominent in local, national, and 
international discourse. The federal government’s current work in the digital privacy space 
centers around the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Privacy 
Framework, which was released in January 2020 [1]. NIST created the framework to help 
organizations identify privacy-related risk. Such risk arises during the development and 
sustainment of applications and systems. The hope is that applying the framework will 
foster a dialog about privacy, privacy-related risks, and the management of those risks at 
all levels of development and sustainment. 
For the purpose of this work, we are using the NIST definition of privacy as 
articulated in the NIST Privacy Framework. NIST describes privacy as a “concept that 
helps to safeguard important values such as human autonomy and dignity,” but the 
framework also acknowledges the shifting nature of privacy and how it adds to the 
difficulty in communicating privacy risks [1]. In this thesis, we use that broad concept of 
privacy to extend the definition to include safeguarding important values of organizations 
as well. This is important since the DON is concerned with the organizational as well as 
individual privacy of its employees. An in depth discussion about the definition of privacy 
is outside of the scope of this thesis, but for a more detailed analysis of debate around the 
definition of privacy, see Mulligan et al. [2]. 
This research presents an application of the NIST Privacy Framework to a 
conceptual model of a Bluetooth-based proximity tracing system inspired by infectious 
diseases such as COVID-19. Our model is designed to capture key characteristics of a 
system the Department of the Navy (DON) plans to acquire. We understand that the 
concept of “contact tracing” is not always synonymous with proximity tracing since contact 
tracing usually involves the work of other entities (i.e., medical professionals) in addition 
2 
to any proximity tracing data and devices that are used. For the rest of this thesis, we refer 
to the DON system as a contact tracing system since this is the accepted language in 
scientific literature for this type of system, and our design of the system also includes more 
components than just the proximity tracing devices.  
The digital contact tracing system described in this thesis collects contact tracing 
data which then flows to a back-end system called Jupiter (which is the current DON name 
for its newly created enterprise data management system). Within Jupiter, the DON will be 
able to perform analysis on the collected contact tracing data while combining it with data 
from other DON databases. This consolidated analysis will enable the preparation and 
dissemination of fleet-readiness products for high-level decision makers concerning 
medical-readiness issues such as those related to COVID-19 cases impacting the DON 
workforce. 
The proposed Navy contact tracing system poses privacy concerns for the DON 
workforce. Privacy violations can lead to a loss of trust and a loss of security. Privacy is 
generally considered an essential quality of free and democratic societies, even if the 
definition of privacy varies among these societies. It is no doubt fundamental to American 
society. The Department of Defense (DOD) is also concerned with the trustworthiness of 
systems that process, store, and transmit privacy-related information, both from a technical 
perspective and how privacy violation could overall affect trust in the DOD and the rest of 
the federal government. 
NIST Internal Report (NISTIR) 8062 defines system trustworthiness as “worthy of 
being trusted to fulfill whatever critical requirements may be needed for a particular 
component, subsystem, system, network, application, mission, enterprise, or other entity” 
while “from a privacy perspective, a trustworthy system is a system that meets specific 
privacy requirements in addition to meeting other critical requirements” [3]. This means 
that the concept of privacy needs to be deliberately introduced into information system 
design. A trustworthy system is currently not assumed to be privacy preserving. 
Trustworthiness has always been centered on addressing security objectives that do not 
necessarily encompass privacy. 
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Loss of trustworthiness of a federal system from a privacy perspective will 
inevitably bleed over into an individual loss of trust in the DOD enterprise. Just as failing 
to manage privacy risks has direct adverse consequences on businesses and their employees 
or customers, an erosion of trust in government institutions will also bring negative effects 
to employees. 
This system may seem like an effort by the federal government to exert more 
control over its employees, and employees might see this as a means to track their activities. 
This has civil liberties concerns, especially if the data can easily be compromised. Even 
worse, it is easy to abuse the data or use it in ways in which it was not meant to be used. 
For example, what if the government used data from a contact tracing system to determine 
that a worker was not at his or her duty station during business hours, or what if the data 
could lead to the revelation that two workers are spending a questionable amount of time 
in close proximity to each other? This concern could be the result of two different aspects 
of a proximity tracing system. Either the system could be used to directly track the 
movements of employees, or private information about employees could be predicted or 
inferred from aggregated data sets. This is why the privacy controls of this system and the 
privacy framework by NIST are so important. They enable confidence, and this confidence 
is part of the foundation for building a capable workforce. 
Privacy can also affect physical and operational security. As with all contact tracing 
systems, individuals can be deanonymized and social graphs can be reconstructed 
constructed with enough effort from data gathered by the system we consider, and which 
DON is procuring. It would not be too much of a stretch for a malicious actor to be able to 
use contact tracing data to be able to reconstruct an organizational chart for a unit, whether 
that malicious actor is either an authorized user within the system or an outside observer. 
If this happens, the physical or operational security of the unit is breached. Privacy should 
be considered an enabler for personnel and unit-level security concerns. 
Data assumed to be private could be used by an adversary for general 
reconnaissance on a military unit. The U.S. military has already seen breaches in private 
information that can lead to potential physical or operational security threats. In 2018, the 
military discovered that fitness tracking apps collect a treasure trove of data that is publicly 
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available, and this data can be used to reveal the locations of military installations overseas. 
In other instances, the data can be used to identify the movement and identities of other 
government employees. The U.S. military has confirmed that this discovery has not 
actually led to a compromise of security, but it is easy to see how this could compromise, 
at the very least, the physical security of a military unit or operational security of a unit’s 
activities [4]. 
This fitness-app scenario is just one example of a compromise of publicly available 
data. There are a growing number of these scenarios, in part driven by the expanding 
adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) devices. As more data is collected and processed from 
a myriad of devices (contact tracing systems included), it will only become more apparent 
that user privacy needs to be taken into account. NIST has already noted public concern 
over the deployment of smart meters. NIST claims that information collected by smart 
home devices presents substantial privacy concerns. This includes the possibility of 
analyzing and tracking individuals or organizations just through their use of smart-energy 
devices [3].  
Privacy and cybersecurity (in the rest of this document, security refers to 
cybersecurity) are different yet related concepts, and privacy aspects in an information 
system can and usually do overlap with security concerns. For example, the safe handling 
of PII is a concern that should be shared by both security engineers and privacy engineers. 
This concern can arise as the result of unauthorized system behavior (a security concern) 
or as a byproduct from the authorized processing of PII (a privacy concern) [3]. The bottom 
line is that privacy and security can affect each other, but these concerns need to be 
approached differently. 
Privacy and security can also be interrelated in the sense that security breaches can 
lead to privacy compromises, and these privacy compromises can in turn affect national 
security. The OPM data breaches in 2015 led to a compromise of the private data of 
millions of Americans [5]. Users of the system assumed the data was secure from 
unauthorized access. The data turned out to be highly privacy-sensitive in nature. The 
stolen data could be damaging to individuals (e.g., by exposing them to identity theft), and 
it could also be used by foreign adversaries to conduct cyber attacks and espionage. This 
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leads to the question of whether or not this data could have been stored in a way that 
preserved the privacy of the individuals even in the event of a compromise. 
In order to ensure that the DON Contact Tracing System is able to effectively 
protect the privacy of the members of its workforce, we conducted an assessment of both 
the proposed contact tracing system and the NIST Privacy Framework. For background 
information, we have detailed the contact tracing system and the larger privacy concerns 
surrounding the system in Chapters II and III, respectively. In Chapter IV, we apply the 
NIST Privacy Framework and model some of the privacy-related risks associated with 
operation of the system. We start by creating a privacy threat model of the contact tracing 
system to identify threats specific to the system, and then we apply the NIST Privacy 
Framework (see Appendix B). Using the NIST Privacy Framework as a guide, we then 
apply privacy and security controls listed in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800–53 rev5 to 
the threats that were identified and consider whether they are adequate to controlling 
privacy risks [6]. We also use the framework to identify new risks or reinforce the severity 
of known risks. After identifying risks and applying the framework with its controls, we 
discuss the risk assessment factors of impact and likelihood and how they are necessary to 
provide a privacy risk assessment to organizations. Then we briefly discuss the extent to 
which the privacy framework fulfills that role. 
In Chapter V, we provide our assessment of the contact tracing system based on the 
application of the framework. We conclude that management of privacy concerns in this 
system requires cognizance of the intersection of policy, disassociability, and security 
when evaluating the degree of privacy afforded by the system. The contact tracing system 
needs a more robust policy on disassociability since that is a privacy control that is largely 
disconnected from security. In addition to the privacy policy on disassociability, privacy-
related goals of all the stakeholders need to be detailed when designing, testing, or 
acquiring this contact tracing system. The decision maker and users should also pay more 
attention to access controls and limit the number of employees that can see re-identified 
data in the contact tracing data. To assess the system’s risk posture with regard to 
anonymity re-identification, we recommend using a robust, accepted approach such as the 
HIPAA Expert Determination de-identification methodology. As a further risk control, we 
recommend that, to the maximum extent possible, only medical professionals are given the 
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access to identified records that link contact tracing data to names or other personal 
information as this reinforces the principle of least privilege. Since privacy controls are 
tailored to specific systems, we also recommend organizations like NSWC Crane 
implement privacy testing and conduct privacy research in a similar manner to how security 
testing is done for systems that are procured by the DON. This would streamline the use of 
the NIST Privacy and Cybersecurity Frameworks in the Risk Management Framework 
(RMF) process. 
Chapter VI provides an assessment of and recommendations for the NIST Privacy 
Framework. Throughout the thesis we consider the relationship between privacy and 
security controls and their protentional for contributing to the overall privacy posture of an 
enterprise. We recommend that NIST consider combining its Privacy and Cybersecurity 
Frameworks into one framework to enable the streamlining of system assessments. The 
recommendation assumes that a combined framework will aid users in identifying risks 
that apply to both privacy and security, but at the same time, aid users in isolating risks that 
apply just to privacy. We also recommend some constraints and cautions on using the NIST 
Privacy Framework. It should not be used as a checklist, and its usefulness is highly 
dependent on the expertise of the organization using it. The organization needs to be able 
to identify its risk tolerance and also be able determine the likelihood of threats without the 
framework since the framework does not provide methods or guidance to determine the 
impact and likelihood of threats. The framework’s main utility is in identifying threats and 
mapping controls to address identified threats. Furthermore, the NIST Privacy Framework 
is a guide to performing risk assessments. As such, the organization applying the 
framework needs to be able to go beyond the guidance to carry out the detailed risk 
assessment of their systems and practices. The thesis concludes with conclusions and 
recommendations for future research. 
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II. SYSTEM AND FRAMEWORK DESCRIPTIONS 
This chapter provides a description of the high-level architecture of a proposed 
Bluetooth contact tracing system under consideration for procurement by the Department 
of the Navy (DON). The system consists of wearable contact tracing devices, storage 
devices that aggregate data collected about users, and the backend platform that stores and 
processes the collected data. The backend platform that will receive the data from the 
storage devices at the various commands is known as Jupiter. Jupiter is the DON’s data 
enterprise management system. Jupiter, via the databases and cloud storage platforms that 
it hosts, provides for conducting data analytics and, in turn, provides decision makers with 
situational awareness of fleet readiness. We use this high-level system architecture and the 
data flow path for contact tracing data as an example application on which to test the NIST 
Privacy Framework for managing privacy-related risk in the DON. 
In addition to providing an overview of the exemplar contact tracing system, this 
chapter contains a summary of the NIST Privacy Framework. This summary provides 
necessary background for our assessments of the privacy properties of the example system 
and the risk management capabilities of the framework itself. The aim of this research is 
to inform the Navy and other organizations (to include private industries) about the 
challenges and way ahead for developing, deploying, and sustaining information systems 
which process, store, and transfer data while effectively managing privacy risks. 
A. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY CONTACT TRACING SYSTEM 
On July 8, 2020, the Department of the Navy issued a Request for Information 
(RFI) (SAM Notice ID N0002420NR24006) about commercially available proximity 
tracking systems [7]. This request was released by the Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) Naval COVID Rapid Response Team (NCR2T) in the wake of the COVID-19 
outbreak in early 2020. While the COVID-19 pandemic affected more than just the 
military, the Navy’s need for a technical solution was reinforced by the events of the USS 
Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) in which more than 1,200 sailors assigned to the carrier 
contracted the virus [8]. This demonstrated that the Navy’s workforce is vulnerable to 
outbreaks of communicable diseases such as COVID-19, but more importantly, such 
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outbreaks can have severe impacts on fleet readiness. Navy leadership concluded that it 
needs a means for identifying and limiting the spread of COVID-19 outbreak, one of the 
means being an enterprise-wide contact tracing system. 
As for the system itself, the request states that the system components should 
include “wearable proximity tracking devices” and “storage processing devices” [7]. The 
users will wear these tracking devices, each of which, identified by a unique identifier, 
calculates and records the identifiers of and distances from other wearable devices that it 
comes in proximity to. Distance measurement and identifier exchange is based on 
Bluetooth signal strength, and the dates/times of the measurements [7]. 
The system concept is that if User A is in close proximity to User B for an extended 
period of time, User A’s device will collect and store the unique identifier of User B and 
the time this interaction took place. At periodic intervals, User A’s collected unique 
identifiers and accompanying metadata will be automatically uploaded to a storage 
processing device (similar to a Wi-Fi router) located on a base or naval vessel. If User B is 
diagnosed with COVID-19, this diagnosis can be annotated in the system. By scanning the 
list of every unique identifier that has been in close proximity to User B’s unique identifier 
in the last few weeks, the system can then determine which users to alert, which in this 
example would be User A. User A would be considered at high risk of having contracted 
the virus, and User A can choose to get tested and/or quarantine. 
The primary benefit of this system is that servicemembers can be identified if they 
have been in close proximity to other servicemembers that have been positively diagnosed 
with COVID-19. The secondary benefit, as stated in the request, is that the DON can use 
this collected data “to determine if social distancing policies put in place by the government 
employers are effective” at preventing outbreaks of COVID-19 within the workforce [7]. 
The DON considers the collected proximity data to be important for aggregated use 
in conducting large-scale analytics. Therefore, an important aspect of contact tracing is 
how and where the data will be stored after collection, and what policies will be applied to 
stored contact tracing data. The RFI is does not speak to data storage and administration. 
When referring to the storage and processing stations, it states that a “Cloud solution is 
desired that would replicate the functionality of the local, standalone device” and that the 
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program administrator will “administer any connections to other databases, such as digital 
medical records” [7]. How the data is collected, stored, processed, and governed within a 
system has implications for privacy. This is the topic of Chapter III. 
After collection, it is reasonable to assume that the proximity data will not remain 
local to the collecting commands and components; rather, we assume that data will be made 
available to the wider DON Enterprise Data Management System for processing in order 
to provide situational awareness to leadership and to facilitate high-level decision-making 
across the department. The DON likely wants to leverage the power of advanced analytics 
or AI/ML techniques while also incorporating data from other databases in the DON 
Enterprise Data Management System in support of this high-level decision-making 
function. 
B. BACKEND DATA FLOW FOR CONTACT TRACING DATA 
This section covers the DON’s modernization of data management and Jupiter 
system. This section also describes how the contact tracing system and Jupiter could 
interoperate. 
1. Modernization of DON Data Management 
When a proximity contact tracing system collects data from edge devices worn or 
carried by DON personnel, that data could remain at the local-command level, we assume 
for the purpose of this research that any proximity data collected by a DON contact tracing 
system will be made available ultimately to the DON’s Enterprise Data Management 
System, also known as Jupiter, as part of an effort to modernize and optimize the DON’s 
data architecture. 
This assumption is based on the posture that the DON has taken around data 
analytics and data sharing in recent years. There has been a push for modernization and 
optimization regarding the Navy strategy around data and analytics. In September 2017, 
the DON chief information officer (CIO) released the “Department of the Navy Strategy 
for Data and Analytics Optimization” [9]. It describes the vision and goals of the 
department in regard to data analytics and data management. The strategy centers on the 
ability to use available department data and analytical assets for the benefit of the DON in 
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order to “enhance our combat capabilities, increase our operational efficiencies, and 
improve our ability to make evidence-based decisions quickly” [9]. 
The DON’s position on data management was further codified when it released the 
“Department of the Navy Information Superiority Vision” in February 2020 [10]. The 
vision is to “modernize, innovate, and defend” the DON infrastructure; and the document 
states that the DON currently “lacks a mastery of its Information Environment” [10]. This 
publication as well as the Navy Strategy publication released in September 2017 emphasize 
the need to leverage data for decision-making purposes using the most modern means and 
technology available. 
In February 2020, the DON chief data officer provided more specific details about 
the DON’s path forward in recognizing its vision. The DON chief data officer asserts that 
the DON’s information eventually will be consolidated into a greater Navy enterprise data 
lake, where data “ownership” is not emphasized, but rather where high quality, usable data 
will be made available to relevant parties [11]. In this environment, machine learning and 
AI algorithms can be applied to this data in order to make better data-driven decisions, 
therefore moving the DON closer to its strategic goals regarding data management. 
All of this leads to Jupiter, which is the DON enterprise data environment launched 
in April 2020. This platform makes data available and usable across the naval enterprise, 
and it provides advanced data tools, context-rich visualizations, and decision-support 
analytics [12]. Jupiter is “at the heart of the DON Data Architecture,” and it is the 
realization of the DON’s data infrastructure modernization efforts [12]. The DON chief 
data officer is currently looking for new naval use cases for this platform, and COVID Fleet 
Readiness is one such use that has been proposed [11], [12]. 
2. COVID-19 Fleet Readiness using Jupiter 
In an effort to consolidate reporting and analytical efforts, the Navy is developing 
a way to leverage this modern DON data architecture in order to consolidate COVID 
reporting to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), standardize COVID 
reporting formats, fuse data, and integrate AI/ML analytics into decision-making. The 
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system is meant to incorporate COVID testing data, supply and logistics data, and 
personnel data into the Jupiter platform as seen in Figure 1 [13]. 
 
Figure 1. Data Flow into Jupiter from Various Databases in the DON. 
Source: [13]. 
3. Integration of Contact Tracing Data into Jupiter 
There is no definitive source that claims that the collected proximity data will 
directly be used in Jupiter as part of a larger fleet readiness system, but it is reasonable to 
assume that if the DON is to incorporate COVID-19 incident and test data into this system, 
the actual contact tracing data of individuals could easily be incorporated as well. This 
follows from the DON’s modernization efforts discussed earlier. For the purposes of this 
thesis, we assume that contact tracing proximity data will be collected using a DON 
procured system and that the collected data will eventually be integrated into the Jupiter 
platform. 
The model for the system architecture referred to in this thesis and pictured in 
Figure 2 will include the wearable devices and the backend Jupiter platform that processes 
12 
the data. This will serve as the model architecture that will be evaluated using the NIST 
Privacy Framework. 
 
Figure 2. Data Flow for the Collected Contact Tracing Data 
C. NIST PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 
This section gives an introduction to the NIST Privacy Framework that will be used 
to evaluate the DON contact tracing system. The NIST Privacy Framework is the result of 
numerous laws, reports, and federal publications. The timeline leading up to the framework 
reflects the U.S. government’s focus on preserving digital privacy in the same way it 
focuses on information security, and it also shows the effort that is being expended toward 
protecting citizens’ privacy in the wake of emerging technologies that pose a threat to 
privacy.  
1. From the Privacy Act of 1974 to the NIST Privacy Framework 
On January 16, 2020, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
released “NIST Privacy Framework: A Tool for Improving Privacy Through Enterprise 
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Risk Management, Version 1.0,” which we refer to as the NIST Privacy Framework [1]. 
The release of this framework is the culmination of years of efforts to move privacy to the 
forefront of the national conversation. Beginning with the Privacy Act of 1974, the United 
States has long had deliberate privacy regulations in place, but in recent years with the 
exponential increase in available data and advances in technology to analyze this data, the 
United States has had to continually reconsider and update its approach to privacy and how 
privacy regulations reflect the country’s commitment to the privacy of its citizens. 
Emerging trends in the technological landscape such as big data in government, 
large scale collection of data by third parties, and metadata versus personal data have 
prompted the government to solidify their stance on digital privacy. In May 2014, the 
White House released two documents titled “Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving 
Values” and “Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective” [14], [15]. Both 
documents reinforced the need for privacy enhancing technologies in the era of massive 
data collection, and they both provided recommendations for writing policy and regulations 
that reconcile the government’s stance on privacy with the privacy threats that come with 
Big Data. Both of these reports shape the context for a DON contact tracing system as the 
volume and the velocity of the data collected and processed has the ability to infringe on 
user privacy. 
The same year those reports were released by the President, Congress enacted the 
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2014 (FISMA), an update to the Federal 
Information Security Management Act of 2002. FISMA 2014 is primarily focused on 
information security, “provid [ing] for development and maintenance of minimum controls 
required to protect federal information and information systems” [16]. This is important 
because it shows that the U.S. government is taking an active role in administering the 
implementation of information security policies. 
In addition to the minimum controls requirement required by the law, FISMA 
requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to update its Circular No. A-130. 
In 2016, the OMB released a revision of OMB Circular No. A-130 to reflect changes in 
laws and advances in technology. The revision “establishes general policy for planning, 
budgeting, governance, acquisition, and management of federal information, personnel, 
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equipment, funds, IT resources, and supporting infrastructure and services,” all while 
placing an emphasis on security and privacy in the federal information life cycle [17]. 
These policy directives are further implemented in “Fiscal Year 2019–2020 Guidance on 
Federal Information Security and Privacy Management Requirements,” released in 
November 2019 as a Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies. 
The memorandum highlights the importance of complying with privacy requirements and 
managing privacy risks. It also provides guidance on agencies’ privacy programs and 
requirements for agencies to report the status of their information security programs to the 
Office of Management and Budget [18]. 
Building on the OBM Circular A-130 emphasis on managing privacy risk, the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) issued NIST Internal Report 
(NISTIR) 8026 “An Introduction to Privacy Engineering and Risk Management in Federal 
Systems” [3]. This document further describes privacy engineering concepts that need to 
be developed and implemented in federal system in order to fulfil the requirements of OMB 
Circular A-130. Ultimately, this document points toward expanding guidance and 
integrating privacy engineering into existing NIST Risk Management Frameworks (RMF). 
One of these RMF documents, NIST Special Publication 800-37 rev2 “Risk 
Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations: A System Life Cycle 
Approach for Security and Privacy,” issued in December 2018, includes updates to 
“integrate privacy risk management processes into the RMF to better support the privacy 
protection needs for which privacy programs are responsible” [19]. Additionally, NIST 
Special Publication 800-53 rev5 “Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems 
and Organizations” released in September 2020 continues to integrate information security 
and privacy into a detailed list of controls, policies, and procedures [6]. While both of these 
publications provide controls and recommendations for security and privacy, NIST 
determined that organizations need frameworks to guide their use of these publications and 
streamline the control selection process, and this leads to the release of the cybersecurity 
and privacy frameworks. 
The NIST publications mentioned above are recommended for ensuring federal 
information systems comply with U.S. government security and privacy requirements, but 
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due to government’s push for enhanced cybersecurity and privacy in non-government 
sectors as well, NIST has been entrusted with developing more flexible cybersecurity and 
privacy risk frameworks for voluntary use by both public and private organizations. This 
started with NIST releasing the “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity v1.0” in February 2014 (with a rerelease of v1.1 in April 2018) as the result 
of the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (CEA) and Executive Order (EO) 13636, 
“Improving Critical Infrastructure” [20]. 
This act and Executive Order were the basis for NIST refining its role in information 
security by developing a cybersecurity risk framework “for voluntary use by owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure” [20]. This framework “offers a flexible way to address 
cybersecurity” and the effects it has on organizations [20]. The NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework does address privacy protections insofar as violations to privacy may result from 
cybersecurity flaws, but the framework also acknowledges the significant difference as well as 
the connection between cybersecurity and privacy. This was a large driver in NIST following 
up the cybersecurity framework with NIST Privacy Framework [1]. Figure 3 shows a timeline 
of the major publications that have led to the NIST Privacy Framework. 
 
Figure 3. Major Publications related to the NIST Privacy Framework 
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2. NIST Privacy Framework 
The NIST Privacy Framework is similar in structure to the Cybersecurity 
Framework, and this is to facilitate organizations being able to use them in tandem. The 
privacy framework acknowledges the challenging nature of defining privacy and 
implementing privacy controls that might not fall purely within the realm of cybersecurity; 
therefore, the framework is intended to be usable in a wide variety of organizations 
regardless of size or technological focus. 
Like the Cybersecurity Framework, the Privacy Framework consists of Core, 
Profile and Implementation Tiers. The Core lists describes privacy activities as categories 
and subcategories. NIST has also provided a mapping, separate from the framework 
document, of these categories to controls in NIST SP 800-53 rev5. These Core activities 
are meant to open a dialogue within an organization about privacy risks and what areas and 
levels of risk the organization is willing to assume. The Profiles provide a way to construct 
organization’s current risk profile based on the Core activities previously identified. Then 
the organization can also construct a target profile showing where they want to be in terms 
of a privacy assessment. Finally, Implementation Tiers are used to evaluate how well an 
organization is adequately managing its privacy risk [1]. Figure 4 gives the NIST 




Figure 4. NIST Privacy Framework Structure. Source: [1]. 
The NIST Privacy Framework is a starting point for organizations to make a 
concerted effort to consider and manage privacy risks. Starting this dialogue and talking 
about privacy risks in an organization should lead to implementing proper controls. This is 
where the NIST 800 series special publications can be integrated into the ongoing process 
of preserving privacy in an organization. 
The DOD requires that cybersecurity requirements follow an RMF that is consistent 
with NIST SP 800-37 according to Department of Defense Instruction 8510.01 [21]. NIST 
SP 800-37 references the Cybersecurity Framework in its controls, but not the Privacy 
Framework. The Privacy Framework is relatively new, and it is imperative that it be applied 
and evaluated thoroughly before being added to NIST Special Publications in the same 
manner as the Cybersecurity Framework. NIST anticipates issues and states the “wealth of 
resources does not yet exist in the privacy domain” as it does with cybersecurity, and 
organizations normally “find it challenging to integrate privacy risk assessment into their 
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risk-management approach” [22]. This is why it is so important that this framework 
eventually be molded into something that provides the utmost utility to organizations in 
applying privacy controls . 
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III. SYSTEM PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS 
This section explores the different privacy considerations of a DON contact tracing 
system starting with a description of the DOD organizations that are responsible for 
privacy. It is important to establish a baseline of what privacy resources and mechanisms 
are already in place at the federal level because this will affect how the NIST Privacy 
Framework will be able to integrate into an already established privacy program. This also 
highlights the organizations that would need to be involved, either directly or indirectly, in 
ensuring privacy in a contact tracing system. The breadth of organizations involved points 
to the scope and scale of the system where data from the system may pass through multiple 
departments and agencies. 
While the granular details of the contact tracing system are not discussed in this 
paper due to the focus on its overall privacy concerns and how the NIST Privacy 
Framework can integrate into a system of this scope and scale, this section describes the 
prominent privacy considerations inherent to the different parts of the system. This includes 
privacy concerns with collection by the wearable devices, and it also includes privacy 
concerns inherent to how the data is stored and processed after collection. 
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRIVACY 
This section details the organizations and some of the resources involved in privacy 
assurance for the DOD. It is necessary to discuss these entities since their function 
contributes to our understanding of how the contact tracing system and NIST Privacy 
Framework would interact with established privacy offices and programs. 
1. Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs 
At the highest level within the Department of Defense, privacy is overseen by the 
Defense Privacy & Civil Liberties Division which administers the DOD Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Programs in accordance with DOD Instruction 5400.11 [23]. This instruction 
details the roles and responsibilities for the DOD Privacy and Civil Liberties Program, but 
also addresses key privacy principles when collecting personally identifiable information 
(PII). This includes directing DOD components to limit the “creation, collection, use, 
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processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, and disclosure of personally identifiable 
information (PII)” to that which is “necessary to accomplish a DOD function,” all of which 
come into play for contact tracing systems [23]. Additionally, this instruction requires 
DOD components to impose conditions when sharing PII with other federal or non-federal 
agencies as well as entities “that govern the creation, collection, use, processing, storage, 
maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposal of the PII” [23]. Furthermore, the data 
collected by the Navy’s contact tracing system will likely be transferred to different owners 
that may or may not fall under the authority of the Defense Privacy & Civil Liberties 
Division. 
The most important contribution of the Defense Privacy & Civil Liberties Division 
is the policy stated in section 1.2.a.(1) of [23] that requires all DOD components to: 
Establish and maintain comprehensive privacy and civil liberties programs 
that comply with applicable statutory, regulatory, and policy requirements, 
and develop and evaluate privacy and civil liberties policies and mange 
privacy risks. 
This is significant because having a privacy program unique to each DOD 
component allows for more detailed regulations and control of the privacy measures of the 
systems owned by those components; however, this can complicate matters in the event 
that PII data moves among systems administered by different components or shared by 
several components. 
2. Privacy Impact Assessments 
Regardless of which component of the DOD that PII resides with, every federal 
agency is required by the E-Government Act of 2002 to complete a Privacy Impact 
Assessment (PIA) for procuring technology that “collects, maintains, or disseminates 
information” that has PII implications [24]. All PIAs are publicly available unless their 
classification or sensitivity does not allow for public release. The purpose of PIAs are to 
show that privacy considerations have been taken into account throughout the entire life 
cycle of the system [24]. 
PIAs address questions relating to PII collected by a system mainly from a legal 
and accounting perspective. It is a standard form that include sections describing the type 
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of data collected, the authority to collect the data, the individuals’ autonomy surrounding 
their data, and whether the proper privacy notices have been provided to individuals. 
Relevant DOD components, agencies, and contractors with access to the system’s data are 
listed on the form along with information on how they will interact with the data in the 
system. 
While PIAs cover many important areas required to assess the privacy of a system, 
they do not cover many technical specifications of the system that may cause underlying 
privacy concerns. That is to be expected since these forms appear to be more for 
compliance purposes while the technical privacy considerations are left to the NIST Special 
Publications that detail the privacy controls that should be used in federal systems. The 
NIST Privacy Framework should be able to merge these two areas—consolidating the 
technical and legal underpinnings of privacy controls in federal systems into a holistic risk-
management view. Currently, PIAs appear to be the DOD requirement that is most similar 
to the NIST Privacy Framework in reference to it being a privacy assessment of a federal 
system; however, the NIST Privacy Framework provides a more detailed roadmap for 
evaluating the privacy of a system. 
3. Department of the Navy Privacy Program 
The Department of the Navy Privacy Program is integral to the successful 
development, operation, and sustainment of the Navy’s contact tracing system because the 
data collected will likely be processed and analyzed by the DON’s data management 
system, Jupiter. In accordance with DOD Instruction 5400.11 mentioned above, the 
Department of the Navy Privacy Program was established by SECNAV Instruction 
5211.5F [23], [25]. The DON Privacy Program mirrors some of the broader policies of the 
DOD Privacy Program, but the DON includes more specific directives when dealing with 
PII. 
It is important to note that SECNAV Instruction 5211.5F directs the DON to protect 
information from unauthorized access or disclosure, and the DON must safeguard 
information with the proper technical controls [25]. Although this heavily alludes to 
security controls, this clearly affects privacy, and this is the sort of thing that the NIST 
Privacy Framework was designed for. It was meant to assess and determine controls for 
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situations where security and privacy overlap [1]. When using the NIST Privacy 
Framework to evaluate this contact tracing system, the system’s stakeholders need to 
address these security and other controls from a privacy perspective, and this is more 
nuanced than just adding encryption to all data collected by the system or ensuring 
authentication of all users that access collected or analyzed data.  
4. DHA and BUMED Privacy Programs 
Another agency that is likely to be a part of the DON Contact tracing system is the 
Defense Health Agency (DHA). We assume that the contact tracing data may be sent to a 
DHA subordinate command like the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED), the 
health care agency for the DON, or that the contact tracing data could be merged with 
medical data from BUMED. When a personal health information (PHI) is collected, stored, 
or processed, it falls under the authority of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), and this includes its own set of privacy standards that are 
continuously updated to keep up with evolving technology [26]. This is the most significant 
factor that separates the DHA Privacy and Civil Liberties Office from the other DOD 
components, and it needs to be taken into consideration when applying the NIST Privacy 
Framework to the DON contact tracing system which will likely process PII and PHI. 
The DHA Privacy and Civil Liberties Office has a detailed and well documented 
privacy program. The DHA Privacy Program Plan lists the federal laws and DOD 
regulations that the DHA is subject to. This includes NIST SP 800-53 “Security and 
Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations,” the RMF guide 
required by DODI 8510.01 “RMF for DOD IT” [26]. The Privacy Program Plan even 
provides a Privacy Controls Mapping to CNSS 1253 (an instruction that builds on NIST 
SP 800-53), and it also provides a Table of Requirements to aid compliance to the DHA 
privacy program authoritative documents [26], [27]. 
The NIST Privacy Framework, if applied properly, should be able to reconcile the 
differences, if any, in the privacy programs between the DON and the DHA. Although both 
programs adhere to the same federal laws and regulations, with the exception of DHA 
adhering to additional PHA privacy regulations, the data flowing between systems 
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administered by these two entities needs to be subject to privacy controls that are 
commensurate with the type and sensitivity level of the data. 
B. PRIVACY TRADEOFFS IN THE DON CONTACT TRACING SYSTEM 
Since the outbreak of COVID-19, there has been a concerted effort within and 
outside the healthcare community to obtain various types of data, including personally 
identifiable information, that can be used to develop and implement measures to defeat the 
COVID-19 pandemic (for a high-level description of the most prominent digital contact 
tracing systems in use, refer to Appendix A). Digital contact tracing is viewed by the 
healthcare industry and governments as an important addition to manual contact tracing. 
The thinking is that automation of the collection and analysis of COVID-19 data will 
reduce the time from sensing or predicting outbreaks to when governments and individuals 
can take action to avoid otherwise severe consequences. However, there are ethical 
considerations surrounding the use of automated contact tracing systems, particularly with 
regard to the potential for misuse of the collected data and the collectors (i.e., recipients) 
of the data not being fully transparent the people on whom data is being collected [28]. 
Most of the discussion around ethical dilemmas of operating digital contact tracing 
systems is centered on privacy. Researchers have delved deeply into this subject by 
analyzing the privacy concerns of some of the more prominent digital contact tracing 
systems used around the world. For a detailed description of these concerns, refer to 
Vaudenay (2020) [29], [30]. Privacy concerns about contact tracing system have impeded 
the speed at which they have been adopted; therefore, these systems cannot fulfill the 
claimed purpose of stopping the spread of the virus. Some of the contact tracing systems 
detailed in Appendix A like the Apple/Google system have tried to use privacy-protective 
features as an enabler to facilitate adoption of their system, but privacy is still a large 
concern [31]. MIT launched a tracker in May 2020 which looks at the policies and 
safeguards surrounding different countries’ digital contact tracing systems [32]. In a broad 
sense, this shapes our assessment of the DON system as well since it highlights some 
attributes of contact tracing systems that are important to the public like their voluntary 
nature and their transparency, and presumably the DON system will be mandatory if it is 
officially rolled out in the fleet. 
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The DON has already outlined some of the specifications that it is requesting in the 
design of its contact tracing system to include a wearable device and the use of Bluetooth 
over GPS for proximity measurements [7]. The following sections cover some of the 
privacy tradeoffs afforded by system design choices that either the DON has already made 
or might consider during later acquisition phases. Privacy affordances can result from 
design choices or be inherently linked to the nature of digital contact tracing systems. The 
privacy effects of such a system may create unwanted outcomes that affect the ability of a 
DON command to conduct its mission. To the extent that design choices mitigate these 
unwanted outcomes, we examine the tradeoffs below. 
1. Centralized versus Decentralized 
The main privacy tradeoff for contact tracing systems is whether the system is 
centralized or decentralized. The distinction between centralized and decentralized systems 
is vital to analyzing the privacy preserving nature of the contact tracing systems in 
development and use. Centralized and decentralized systems can best be explained in terms 
of who has power over the data or how the data is controlled and used. 
Centralized contact tracing systems generally involve having a primary data center 
operated by public or private healthcare authorities. The data center serves as the center of 
gravity for data storage and processing, and the authority operating the data center has 
access the ability to process the incoming data and potentially re-identify data that is being 
collected. Consider the following high-level description of an example of a tracing system 
founded on a centralized computing scheme. When a user is registered with the system, the 
data center server issues the user a cryptographically generated temporary identifier that 
will be broadcasted via Bluetooth to other users within Bluetooth range [33]. If a user is 
diagnosed with COVID-19, and the user uploads the temporary identifiers and associated 
metadata (e.g., time and estimated distance) observed from other devices to the central data 
location, authorities that control that data repository are able to determine how that 
proximity data is processed. They also control the ability to determine which users are now 
at risk and notify those users to take appropriate follow-on actions (medical testing, self-
isolation, etc.) [34]. All the while, the authority overseeing this system has assess to user 
data flowing through the system. 
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Decentralized systems, on the other hand, give the users more agency over their 
own data. In a completely decentralized system, there exists no central authority that has 
the power to utilize the data being collected and stored throughout the system. Essentially, 
end users have access to only their data (usually stored in their end devices), and they do 
not have control over or access to the data of others. 
In decentralized contact tracing systems, the temporary identifiers that users 
broadcast are usually generated cryptographically in the users’ devices derived from a seed 
known only to each device. If a user is diagnosed with COVID-19, they can upload the 
seed used to generate their temporary identifiers to a backend server. Other devices 
periodically query this backend server for seeds from positively diagnosed users. When a 
device downloads those seeds, it can generate the temporary identifiers locally and 
compare them to temporary identifiers that they have stored locally in their devices over 
the relevant exposure period. If their device finds a match between the temporary 
identifiers computed from received seeds and the temporary identifiers observed, the 
device can establish that the user might be at risk due to exposure, and alert the user to take 
appropriate measures [30]. Yet the backend server, which knows only the seeds reported 
by individuals who have opted to disclose their positive test status, cannot establish when 
or where in the network of proximity relationships between users any specific interactions 
took place. Further, the server has learned no information from users who have not 
disclosed a seed, and its capacity to make secondary use of proximity data is thereby 
limited. 
The aspect of centralized and decentralized contact tracing systems, as it relates to 
this assessment of the DON system, revolves around the control and the ability to use the 
collected data for decision making purposes. The description of the DON system in the RFI 
fits squarely in the realm of centralized systems. The DON even states that it wants to use 
the collected data to determine if social distancing policies have been working [7]. The 
benefit to the DON using a centralized contact tracing system lies mainly with the ability 
of the DON to control access to and use of the data. A centralized system can provide more 
data to healthcare workers an decision makers if it is possible to observe a more complete 
representation of the social graph between users than contact tracers might otherwise have 
[30]. Centralized systems can also allow for a human in the loop (discussed in Section 
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III.B.3) to augment the analysis and evaluation of the spread of the infection [33]. Another 
advantage of centralized systems is that it enables DON workers to ensure the data is 
available and actionable to the parties that need it and to control secondary uses of data in 
explicit ways. Otherwise, data could remain siloed in separate collections, potentially 
countering analytical benefits of collecting proximity data in the first place. 
The privacy tradeoff with the DON using a centralized system revolves around the 
DON’s ability to potentially make secondary use of data provided (for example, inferring 
location from proximity information or using proximity data to investigate conformance 
with social distancing requirements). A central server could also be breached by an 
adversary (or insider threat), disclosing data to unscrupulous entities; such breaches could 
even introduce a backdoor mechanism that converts temporary identifiers to associated 
long term identifiers or otherwise deanonymize users. While the ability to pull off an attack 
that could compromise the server and backdoor might be difficult to achieve, the impact of 
a successful attack would be severe [30]. 
2. Wearable Device versus Phone App 
Another tradeoff concerning the privacy of the DON contact tracing system is how 
wearable devices and phone apps interact with the system. One of the most prominent 
privacy concerns with phone apps is the amount of private data as well as the number of 
sensors present on all smartphones. Although the contact tracing apps described above 
claim to protect private data by only broadcasting pseudorandom temporary identifiers, it 
would not be too crazy of a thought that if a poorly developed app were somehow 
compromised, it could exfil sensitive data located on the user’s device [35]. 
In contrast to a smartphone app, a wearable device’s capacity for privacy is based 
on the amount and type of the data stored on the wearable device. No personal data should 
be stored on the device, and the device should not maintain a persistent internet connection. 
This means that there would be no risk of extraneous data being transmitted by the wearer 
[35]. The only data capable of being transmitted would temporary identifiers and their 
associated metadata (signal strength, contact time, duration, etc.) used by the system for 
making risk assessments. 
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There may have been several reasons why the DON has chosen to procure a 
wearable device rather than develop or use a phone app. These could include cost, 
simplicity, or more control over the system. Either way, privacy assurance of using either 
a wearable device or a phone app is based largely on privacy controls that ensure that only 
data necessary for the operation of the system is able to be collected and that users are 
aware of what data is being collected from them. The DON needs to consider these controls 
and their impacts when ensuring what type of data is collected during operation of the 
system. 
3. Human in the Loop versus Automated 
With any contact tracing system, there is the concern of the extent of human 
interaction in the system versus automation. There is obviously a benefit to having heavy 
human interaction in the system. The system implemented by Singapore (wearable and 
smartphone app) was chosen over the Apple/Google system because it gives Singapore 
health officials the ability to keep humans in the loop of contact tracing [33], [36]. The 
developers of their system acknowledge the privacy benefits of using an automated 
notification system, but they also understand the need for human contact tracers to be 
included in the system to be able to incorporate other outside information besides just 
physical proximity data [33]. The human contact tracers can incorporate data that is not 
collected by the app such as locations and environmental conditions. 
Human-in-the-loop and automation approaches when designing a system like the 
DON system are not a “one or the other” decision. It is a spectrum approach, and each 
organization has the ability to determine how much of the system they want automated and 
how much human interaction they require. There are essentially two areas that where a 
human in the loop can play a major role. Humans can be used for exposure notification and 
treatment and humans can be involved in secondary uses of data to produce aggregated 
readiness products. 
Since the DON wants to use COVID-19 data for decision-making and fleet 
readiness purposes, it makes sense that they would want to incorporate contact tracing data 
into the decision-making process. A more human-in-the-loop approach allows these 
decision makers to have more of a say in this process. This contact tracing data can be 
28 
evaluated by decision makers and merged with other COVID-19 related datasets to include 
manual contact tracing data. This will result in cleaner and more complete data that can 
then be fed into the Jupiter data management system. Once again, this increased human 
involvement and access to collected data has the potential to raise privacy concerns, but 
that privacy risk has to be weighed in light of the data’s value and benefit to naval 
operations, and the DON has to try to mitigate these privacy concerns as much as possible. 
4. Location Based versus Proximity Based 
Proximity based methods are the more privacy preserving choice for a contact 
tracing system. In a world where privacy does not matter, location-based methods would 
certainly be the preferred choice in most environments as it would be able to tie location 
data to proximity data. Countries like China, Israel, and South Korea use citizen’s 
electronic location data for contact tracing; therefore, some countries believe the privacy 
tradeoff is insignificant compared to the cost of the pandemic lockdown [37]. 
There is still a debate about whether location data is even more beneficial, 
necessary, or even useful in contact tracing since the only data that seems to matters is 
whether people are in close enough contact to for a period time to spread the infection [37]. 
Regardless, none of the most prominent digital contact tracing systems include location-
based data in their design, and this consideration is likely due to privacy concerns and 
concerns about the willingness of users to support adoption of a system if it tracks their 
location data—data which could be viewed by governments, health authorities, or other 
users. 
The DON chose the more privacy preserving option, but the Bluetooth tracking 
systems are not without privacy concerns. Back in 2004, MIT researchers used the 
Bluetooth capability of mobile phones as “wearable sensors” along with machine learning 
techniques to determine information about users’ patterns of activity. They were able to 
reconstruct user daily movement patters as well as infer friendship relationships between 
users [38]. The MIT paper shows that proximity data has significant value, and this value 
increases when linked to ancillary data. This poses an inherent threat to collecting 
proximity data from DON employees, and this plays into the potential privacy pitfalls of 
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the DON contact tracing system that need to be accounted for in a privacy risk assessment 
and mitigated by privacy controls. 
C. FLEET READINESS SYSTEM PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS 
Once proximity data has been collected from the wearable contact tracing system, 
the data may be stored locally at each command, but its utility to the Navy is mainly 
predicated on its ability to be integrated into the larger DON enterprise. This integration 
will allow that data to be processed and analyzed using advanced analytic techniques, but 
it also allows the sharing of the data between entities. Making this data available for sharing 
between DON entities will enhance the analytic capabilities of the system, and it will 
provide more detailed and accurate fleet readiness products to high-level decision makers 
in the DON. 
This backend system that stores and processes the data comes with inherent privacy 
risks that need to be addressed. Most of these risks are due to the scope and scale of this 
system and would be inherent to any datasets that are absorbed by the DON’s enterprise 
management system. This section will highlight the larger privacy issues facing the use of 
this system to process contact tracing data. Identifying the privacy concerns of this system 
is necessary to applying the NIST Privacy Framework, which is done in Chapter IV. 
1. Data Governance by Multiple Organizations 
In a system of this scope and size, the data collected is going to traverse several 
subsystems that belong to different organizations, which means that the overall system will 
fall under several different, usually overlapping, privacy programs. This aspect of data 
governance affects the buying decisions of the DON since the DON needs to ensure 
contractors involved in this system adhere to DOD privacy regulation. The NIST Privacy 
Framework addresses this as the framework attempts to give guidance on how to deal with 
situations where the purchasing agency has to choose between several different suppliers 
that have different sets of privacy requirements or their privacy requirements are different 
than the purchasing agency [1]. 
This concern is applicable when initially purchasing the wearable contact tracing 
devices and storage devices. The NIST Privacy Framework can help the DON determine 
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their list privacy requirements, and this can be used as a template for selecting a vendor for 
the devices. Any privacy gaps determined to be in the vendor’s system will need to be 
weighed against the privacy risk willing to be assumed by the DON. The DON already 
does this for security when procuring new systems. In August 2020, Naval Surface Warfare 
Center Crane Division assisted with providing security assessments of a potential contact 
tracing system that was to be procured by the DON for trials at the United States Naval 
Academy (USNA). While security assessments of a system are important from a privacy 
perspective as well, attention should also be given to aspects of the system that pose a 
privacy threat in addition to the security of the system. 
It is important to note that the DON Privacy Program does address contractor 
privacy responsibilities, and the idea is that they comply with federal privacy regulations 
and receive the proper privacy training [39]. This sets the foundation for legal compliance 
for contractors when handling PII and PHI, but there should be some other additional 
mechanism that aids contractors and the DON in ensuring privacy in systems rather than 
just putting a check in the box that the system is legally compliant. There appears to be no 
technical guidance about data governance by Contractors, and this makes it difficult for the 
DON to guarantee privacy of data across multiple systems that involve different contractor 
software and hardware. 
One of the main considerations around privacy and data governance that will arise 
from this system’s architecture will be the transference of data to and from the Military 
Health System (MHS) and the DON’s subcomponent, BUMED. The DON is already 
proposing a system where BUMED data is integrated into the Jupiter data management 
system in order to provide fleet readiness information to the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (OPNAV) [13]. If contact tracing data is to be sent to BUMED from each 
command before being integrated into the Jupiter system, that data will go from being PII 
to PHI since DHA oversees “covered entities” under HIPAA which include health care 
providers that can handle health care data in electronic form [26]. 
When the contact tracing data is collected at a Navy command, the data must be 
treated as PII if it contains pieces of information that are unique identifiers for employees. 
After contact tracing data is generated from the wearable devices, the contact tracing data 
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has to be linked to a personal identifier at some point in the system. This is so that the 
wearer of a device can be contacted if they are at risk of having contracted COVID-19. If 
this contact tracing data is sent to BUMED, it can be linked with PHI data about the 
individuals. This gives health professional more information to work with in analyzing the 
spread of COVID-19. This also gives OPNAV via the Jupiter system more data to work 
with in making predictions about fleet readiness; however, when the contact tracing data is 
released from BUMED, the data is no longer covered under HIPAA. 
Essentially the DON needs to be able to use the NIST Privacy Framework to 
reconcile multiple subsystems of the larger contact tracing system in order to ensure that 
technologically their privacy controls are on the same level. Many of the same legal and 
regulatory statues apply to organizations working with or within the DOD; therefore, a 
focus should be placed on technological controls as subsystems interact. The NIST Privacy 
Framework needs categories to identify these potential privacy controls gaps and be able 
to lead system engineers in a direction that will lead to adequate technical privacy controls. 
2. Distributed Architecture 
This section highlights the concerns with the contact tracing system being spread 
out across the DON enterprise. If contact tracing data was to remain local to each 
command, these concerns would not be as worrisome; however, the RFI for the system did 
request some type of class based storage architecture [7]. This implies that a more 
distributed nature, and privacy controls need to be implemented accordingly. 
a. Cloud Architecture 
The contact tracing system will use a cloud architecture for storing processing, and 
transferring data, as the DON is planning on using Microsoft Azure services as part of the 
system [13]. In the RFI for the wearable contact tracing system, it also mentions the 
possibility of the collected data being stored in a cloud-based architecture [5]. Security and 
Privacy have been studied extensively in in cloud computing in recent years [40], [41]. 
While the research overwhelmingly discusses cloud security, cloud privacy receives less 
attention, and is often cited as ancillary to the architecture but necessary to ensure trust in 
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the overall system or application. The following paragraphs represent some of the privacy 
concerns related to the cloud storage aspect of this system. 
While access control usually falls under security measures, it also fits squarely in 
the realm of privacy measures, and this is particularly applicable to a large cloud-based 
system that will likely have different levels of privacy requirements. This can be a 
complicated feature of a large system like the one being described in this paper. The contact 
tracing data stored in the cloud can be integrated with other types of data that may not have 
the same privacy requirements, and this could further complicate access control, and access 
control lists can become unmanageable [42]. This issue of access control is fundamental to 
any system, and it is important to see if the NIST Privacy Framework can walk developers 
of this contact tracing system toward a technically feasible, economically viable, and fit-
for-purpose access control solution that best preserves privacy. 
Another privacy aspect of accessing data in a cloud architecture is the ability of an 
adversary to infer user behavior when accessing sensitive data [40]. While unauthorized 
users accessing sensitive contact tracing or medical data can directly lead to OPSEC 
concerns, this vulnerability of inferring user behavior is easier to overlook. Information 
can be leaked indirectly by observing the pattern or timing in which someone else accesses 
the data. This could lead to an adversary or unauthorized user gathering information about 
fleet readiness or other operations. 
Using a cloud-based architecture also increases the difficulty of conducting audits 
on the system [42]. Audits ensure privacy policy compliance but conducting audits may be 
difficult on a system of this nature since there may be multiple privacy policies based on 
the type of data stored (PII versus PHI). Auditing would have to scale to several 
subsystems, and this would raise the question of whether or not the audit mechanism can 
be integrated at the command level where the data is collected and can also be integrated 
within the Jupiter and Azure architectures. The other option would be separate custom audit 
mechanisms needed in each subsystem of the architecture. 
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b. Priority of Data 
The distributed nature of this system leads to questions of whether or not the NIST 
Privacy Framework is effective in helping the DOD to conduct an adequate risk assessment 
when different nodes in the architecture may have different risk tolerances. The stance of 
the DON CIO must be to eliminate unauthorized disclosures of personal information 
whenever possible, but some personal data is more critical to operations than other personal 
data, and this should play into the risk calculations when assessing the privacy risk of this 
contact tracing system. 
For example, the readiness of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) that is about to deploy 
is likely to be a higher priority than the readiness of the students at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) or the United States Naval Academy (USNA), but ultimately it comes down 
to a discussion of risk. It is easy to automatically think that the leaking of a COVID-19 
outbreak in a CSG would constitute more risk to operations, but that is not completely true. 
While the priority of the operations of a CSG might be higher than that of operations at the 
USNA or NPS, likelihood and impact also play a role in determining risk. Priority of data 
is just a single, but important factor in determining risk. This priority of data combined 
with the likelihood and impact of inadvertent disclosure could tip the scale and cause 
leadership to increase or lower the privacy risk tolerance of that data (this is discussed 
deeper in Chapter IV). If the DON determines that certain data is more valuable to fleet 
readiness and operations, then the DON will have to accept more privacy risk regarding 
this data, as it is more likely to reveal valuable readiness information if disclosed. 
The same way that the NIST Privacy Framework should lead users to being able to 
make a risk assessment of a system involving multiple entities (in this case, government 
agencies and contractors) that may interact with the system, it should also be able to assess 
the criticality of data being collected so that it can be prioritized when calculating privacy 
risk tolerance. 
3. De-identification 
De-identification is one of the quintessential focus areas of privacy research much 
in the same way that encryption techniques are the focus of a lot of security research. De-
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identification is a process where data is modified so that individuals cannot be specifically 
re-identified and others cannot gleam information about an individual using other attributes 
about him or her [43]. Research has shown that the capability exists to re-identify large 
data sets. One prominent example would be the de-identification of the Netflix Prize 
dataset, where researchers were able to identify individual subscribers from a set of 
500,000 subscribers on Netflix. They were able to correlate this data the Internet Movie 
Database (IMDB) data to even reveal other potentially sensitive information about users 
[44]. Another set of researchers were able to identify 95% of individuals using only four 
spatio-temporal points from their cellphone data [45]. These examples are meant to show 
that de-identification has become a major concern surrounding big data sets and individual 
privacy, and since the contact tracing system will feed the contact tracing data into AI/ML 
algorithms for processing, the DON needs to take the proper precautions to limit re-
identification if data has been de-identified. 
One of the issues surrounding de-identification that needs to be addressed is the 
tradeoff between the privacy of the data and the utility of the data. The DON will eventually 
have to make such a tradeoff because guaranteeing a certain level of privacy in terms of 
data e-identification can lead to a decrease in the utility of the data being processed [42]. 
The DON needs to clearly define an upper bound to privacy controls and that needs to be 
based on the utility that they expect from the data being processed. In other words, if too 
much identifying information is removed from the data collected the data will be of limited 
use in some forms of predictive analysis. The DON needs a framework or some kind of 
metric to analyze the privacy versus utility tradeoff in this contact tracing system.  
Since the contact tracing system is likely to be centralized system (as described in 
section III.B.1.), this brings with it the tradeoff of centralized versus decentralized de-
identification [42]. Centralized de-identification may be a more complex approach for the 
DON as the DON is given the authority to de-identify data as it sees fit as long as de-
identification is done in accordance with regulations. The DON would then need to make 
the tradeoff described earlier about how much de-identification will affect the use of the 
data. On the other hand, if a decentralized architecture were proposed for the wearable 
devices, the contact tracing data could be de-identified locally, but this would limit the use 
of the data as now identifiers have been removed that could have been used to link other 
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data sources (i.e., BUMED data). It makes sense that the DON would want to use a 
centralized system, but there needs to be a mechanism or a requirement on how they 
anonymize the contact tracing data. The NIST Privacy Framework should address at least 
some aspect of this. 
The final major consideration about de-identification revolves around the challenge 
of streaming data [42]. With the rise of IOT devices being commonplace, the volume and 
velocity of the data comes into play. Most of this information is continuously streamed and 
may have to be analyzed in real or near real time. If the edge devices (the wearable devices 
in this case) in the contact tracing system were set up to undertake more of the processing 
workload, this could alleviate the amount of data pushed to the backend server for follow-
on processing. This is similar to this contact tracing system. The contact tracing data will 
be streaming to data repositories daily, and the system has to be able to de-identify these 
streams of data if necessary. This operation also has to be able to scale to the enterprise 
level. This means that traditional static privacy rules may not be adequate, and “new 
adaptive privacy preservation and enforcement mechanisms are required” [42]. The de-
identification method (i.e., differential privacy or k-anonymity) will have to change based 
on the stream and its content, and not rely on the ability to look at a static data set and 
remove the appropriate number of identifiers. 
This concludes the description of the major privacy concerns that we identified 
surrounding the model of the DON’s contact tracing system detailed in this thesis. The next 
chapter documents the application of the NIST Privacy Framework in a risk assessment for 
addressing the privacy concerns that we identified. The privacy concerns can be prioritized 
base on severity and likelihood of occurrence, then addressed in priority order in the 
development of the contact tracing system. 
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IV. RISK MODELING 
A. PRIVACY RISK MANAGEMENT 
The privacy concerns described in Chapter III and the application of the NIST 
Privacy Framework drive toward developing a privacy risk assessment of a system. 
Organizational leadership can then use this privacy risk assessment to make decisions 
about how to use information in an informed manner. As mentioned earlier, federal 
agencies are required to create Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA) for systems that collect, 
store, process, and distribute private data of employees and citizens. These PIAs effectively 
identify some problem areas that might arise when handling private data, but they are 
usually policy driven rather than technology driven. They do not directly link to 
implementing policy or technology controls to ensure privacy. Even when using the NIST 
Privacy Framework, PIAs are just one NIST SP 800-53 rev5 control of many when 
conducting a privacy assessment. 
Risk assessment is another privacy control recommended by NIST SP 800-53 rev5. 
The fact that risk assessment is only one control can be misleading since risk assessment 
is such a large, underlying portion of system design, and it is an important aspect of 
determining the privacy afforded by a system. All privacy decisions affect the risk 
assessment. This point is more clearly articulated by the utility versus privacy tradeoff 
described in Chapter III. It is possible that instituting a small number of privacy controls 
can have a positive impact on our ability to analyze collected data; however, the risk of a 
privacy breach may increase—resulting in more risk to the organization and its customers 
and/or employees. This is why risk management is integral to assessing the DON Contact 
Tracing System and applying the NIST Privacy Framework. 
Another area of focus that should be included in the risk assessment is threat 
modeling. Traditionally cyber threat modeling has been used by developers and designers 
to determine security risks to a system by identifying assets, attackers, and attack vectors. 
The NIST Privacy Framework does not explicitly identify threat modeling as a privacy 
concern even though there have been several organizations that have developed privacy 
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threat modeling frameworks, and two of those frameworks are discussed in the following 
sections. 
The rest of this chapter will combine threat modeling with the NIST Privacy 
Framework in order to develop a rudimentary risk assessment model of the DON Contact 
Tracing System. 
B. PRIVACY THREAT MODELING 
Threat modeling is an invaluable activity in designing and evaluating software. It 
assists developers in identifying and understanding threats, vulnerabilities, and possible 
avenues of risk mitigation by trying to discover and model the actions of a malicious actor. 
The likelihood of attacks occurring is then combined with the potential damage they can 
cause, and this leads to a risk assessment of the system or app. Most threat modeling 
frameworks are intended to be used to reason about security risks. There also appears to be 
an assumption that good quality of security will translate into good quality of privacy. One 
of the oldest and most popular security threat modeling techniques is Microsoft’s STRIDE 
(an acronym for Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of 
service, and Elevation of privilege) which uses threat categories to discover security 
weaknesses that align with security properties within the CIA triad [46]. 
While threat model methods like STRIDE apply more to cybersecurity, that is not 
always sufficient for privacy in information systems. Privacy protection requires a more 
abstract way of thinking and a different threat model. That is not to say that privacy threat 
modeling cannot benefit from aspects of security threat models. For example, the STRIDE 
method begins with modeling the system by building a data flow diagram (DFD) [46]. This 
is also useful to privacy threat modeling; however, privacy entails more than just making 
sure that data is obscure to an external threat (i.e., confidential). Privacy comes with its 
own properties that need to be observed when threat modeling. 
One of the recent developments in privacy-centric threat modeling are LINDDUN 
[47] and Cloud Privacy Threat Modeling (CPTM); an overview of both of these are given 
in this section. The DON Contact Tracing system utilizes a cloud system architecture; 
therefore, the threat model has to address this architecture in some way. 
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This concept of privacy threat modeling directly intersects with the NIST Privacy 
Framework. There are aspects of threat modeling baked into the NIST Privacy Framework, 
but the framework does not directly address threat modeling. That is why this chapter will 
create a privacy threat model for the DON Contact Tracing system. A well thought out 
threat model will facilitate the application of the NIST Privacy Framework. 
The NIST Privacy Framework is being applied at the beginning of the System 
Development Life cycle (SDLC) for the contact tracing system, and that is also where 
threat modeling should initially take place regardless of the development framework used. 
If vulnerabilities can be discovered early in the development life cycle, developers can 
make architectural changes in a more timely and less costly fashion [46]. 
The rest of this chapter will discuss two different privacy-centric threat model 
methods, and then construct a basic threat model for the DON Contact Tracing system 
before applying controls from the NIST Privacy Framework. 
1. LINDDUN 
LINDDUN (a mnemonic for Linkability, Identifiability, Non-repudiation, 
Detectability, Disclosure of information, Unawareness, and Non-compliance) is a privacy-
centric threat modeling methodology that uses a systematic approach in dealing with 
privacy threats. This approach involves first modeling the system using a DFD similar to 
STRIDE. Then threats are identified and mapped to the DFD using LINDDUN’s threat 
taxonomy. Finally, threats are managed by choosing different mitigation strategies and 
privacy enhancing technologies (PET) [47]. 
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Figure 5. LINDDUN Methodology. Source: [47]. 
LINDDUN is not unlike the NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) and the 
NIST Privacy Framework. The LINDDUN steps resemble the Categorize, Select, and 
Implement steps of the RMF. While the RMF has traditionally been more focused on 
information security threats, the NIST Privacy Framework isolates many privacy-centric 
aspects of designing or evaluating a system, much like the LINDDUN methodology. 
Understanding the LINDDUN methodology will be helpful in creating a threat 
model for the DON Contract Tracing System because of the importance of the data flow 
aspect of the system and the importance of mapping threats to that dataflow. The data flow 
for the contact tracing system involves more than just local storage in a database at a 
command. The data in the system is being collected from individual users in the DON and 
then transmitted to and stored in the DON Enterprise Data Management System. The threat 
model needs to represent these and other data flows because there are risks associated with 
data in motion and at rest. 
2. CPTM 
There are data flows in the contact tracing system that involve cloud services; the 
threat model needs to represent cloud-specific privacy threats. The development of the 
Cloud Privacy Threat Modeling (CPTM) methodology was in response to the need for 
reasoning about privacy risks when data is handled by cloud services. CPTM was originally 
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developed to be used in accordance with the EU Data Protection Direction (DPD). DPD is 
tailored for use with EU privacy laws and regulations. However, the methodology can be 
applied in reasoning about privacy implications of applying cloud computing outside the 
EU [48]. 
Like LINDDUN, CPTM includes three main steps. These steps are as follows: 
identify the main entities to the cloud environment, describe the privacy requirements that 
must be implemented, and provide countermeasures for identified threats [48]. As shown 
in Figure 6, [48] also proposes extending the CPTM methodology steps to align with steps 
in the SDLC.  
 
 
Figure 6. Cloud Privacy Threat Modeling (CPTM) and the Software 
Development Life Cycle (SDLC). Source [48]. 
These CPTM steps provide an overlap with some Core categories and functions in 
the NIST Privacy Framework, but with the CPTM methodology, the steps are more focused 
on a specific type of architecture and more aligned temporally when designing a system. 
The CPTM methodology reinforces the steps taken to build a privacy threat model for the 
DON Contact Tracing System. 
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C. CONTACT TRACING THREAT MODEL 
It is important understand the distinction between security and privacy threats and 
where they overlap. While developing the privacy threat model, like with using LINDDUN 
and CPTM, threats to privacy are identified for the system at different stages in the data flow. 
1. System Data Flow 
Figure 7 shows at a high level of abstraction the entities and data flows for a 
hypothetical version of the DON Contact Tracing System. For a more detailed system 
diagram, see Chapter II. 
 
Figure 7. Contact Tracing System Data Flow 
2. Threat Assessment 
The following three sections show the privacy threats at different stages of the data 
flow. 
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a. Collection Stage 
Table 1 lists ways in which private data is vulnerable during the collection stage. 
This is the stage when end user devices are transmitting Bluetooth identifiers to other end 
user devices and collection sites. It is important to note that physical security also comes 
into play in this stage. 
Table 1. Threat Assessment during the Collection State 
Threat Vector Mitigation Impact 
De-
identification 
Set up a collection 
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b. Cloud Architecture 
Table 2 lists ways in which personal data can be vulnerable when being processed 





Table 2. Threat Assessment during the Processing Stage 
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c. Decision-making Products and Announcements 
Table 3 shows ways in which private data can be vulnerable based on a what kind 
of fleet readiness and decision-making products a commander requires. Reporting based 
on certain data private sets could also leak OPSEC information. 
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Table 3. Threat Assessment of the Dissemination Stage 











Mainly impacts the 
OPSEC of commands by 
revealing force readiness 
to adversaries 
 
Targeting of most at risk 
commands 
 
Possible false inject 




can used products 
and reports to de-
identify users by 










D. CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION 
This section focuses on the controls that should be implemented to mitigate the 
threats identified in the previous section. We are using controls from NIST SP 800-53 rev5 
since NIST provides a mapping from the NIST Privacy Framework to controls in NIST SP 
800-53 rev5. See Appendix B for a more detailed breakdown of the NIST Privacy 
Framework Core Functions and controls that can be applied specifically to this system. 
The controls for this system can fit broadly into several categories which include 
Policy and Procedures (i.e., PIAs, Data Sharing Agreements, and Data Tagging), 
Disassociability (i.e., de-identification and linkage attacks), and Security Controls (i.e., 
Access controls, Encryption, Physical Security). The relationship between these categories 
is shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Control Categories and their Relationships to One Another 
1. Policy and Procedures 
NIST SP 800-53 includes a Policy and Procedures control as the first control in 
each control family of the publication. In fact, some of the Core Functions in the NIST 
Privacy Framework map to “all -1 controls,” meaning that the subcategory being 
referenced is entirely mitigated by policies and procedures, regardless of the given control 
family from NIST SP 800-53 rev5 [6]. Additionally, other subcategories map to a Policy 
and Procedures control and that refers to a specific control family in NIST SP 800-5 rev5. 
For example, NIST Privacy Framework subcategory CT.PO-P1 maps to NIST SP 800-53 
rev5 control PT-1 which addresses Policy and Procedures in regard to Personally 
Identifiable Information Processing and Transparency. 
The PT-1 control states that “The risk management strategy is an important factor 
in establishing such policies and procedures” [6]. This is why policies and procedures 
should be a direct reflection of the risk assessment of a system. To that end, every 
organization and system will have different risk assessments which is why policy and 
procedures will be unique to those organizations and systems. This is why it is sufficient 
for NIST 800–53 rev5 to not be highly detailed in its guidance on implementation of policy 
and procedures. It is important for the framework to emphasize this step because this step 
lays the foundation for legal, regulatory, and technical controls needed for privacy 
assurance. 
2. Disassociability 
Aspects of disassociability could be included under Policy and Procedures since 
organizations should have a standardized procedure for de-identifying data, and that should 
be based on what the organization considers an acceptable risk of re-identification and 
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linkage attacks. Disassociability to include de-identification also has a technical 
component which is why it is included in a category separate from Policy and Procedures. 
The NIST Privacy Framework provides a Category called Disassociated Processing 
(CT.DP-P) which provides data processing solutions that “increase disassociability 
consistent with the organization’s risk strategy to protect individuals’ privacy and enable 
implementation of privacy principles” [1]. This encompasses more than just de-
identification and linkage attacks, but ultimately this represents technical privacy-by-
design choices and controls that need to be applied in order to provide privacy assurance. 
Many of the controls in this Disassociated Processing Category relate to design and 
architecture (see Table 4). This circles back to one of the first considerations of the system 
– whether or not a centralized or decentralized system will be used. This design choice, 
however, is not specifically mentioned in the NIST SP 800-53 rev5 controls. These kinds 
of decisions are left up to the developers to make during system design. The NIST standard 
provides guidance instead of being prescriptive. 
Table 4. Controls in the Disassociated Processing Category Related to 
Architecture and Design. Adapted from [1], [6]. 
NIST SP 800-53 rev5 Control 
ID 
Control Name 
PL-8 Security and Privacy Architecture 
PM-7 Enterprise Architecture 
SA-8 Security and Privacy Engineering Principles 
SA-17 Developer Security and Privacy Architecture and 
Design 
SC-42 Sensor Capability and Data 
CM-6 Configuration Settings 
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The NIST Privacy Framework treats de-identification as a product of how the 
system is designed and implemented; it also addresses this issue directly with control SI-
19 (De-Identification). De-identification is singled out because if the de-identification 
policy and corresponding technology do not sufficiently protect user privacy (“sufficient” 
being a relative term here referring to what an organization and its customers deem 
acceptable), the privacy risk can grow outside what is considered by the organization to be 
tolerable. This will be discussed more in the next chapter. 
3. Security Controls 
While not the focus of this research, security controls play a role in privacy 
assurance. The extent to which security controls should be included in the privacy 
conversation is discussed in the next chapter. The security controls of a system are usually 
technical in nature, but when it comes to privacy assurance, these security controls need to 
be integrated into the privacy policies and procedures of an organization that manages data 
to be kept private. This section highlights that the threat model identifies security-based 
controls that need to be implemented and included in an organization’s privacy policies 
and procedures. 
The Protect Function (PR-P) in the NIST Privacy Framework is almost entirely 
focused on security-based (CIA) controls that provide a level of privacy assurance. This 
includes controls that enhance authentication management, access control, and 
transmission confidentiality; and all of these types of controls are required by the contact 
tracing system to some extent (see Table 5). The NIST Privacy Framework in conjunction 
with NIST SP 800-53 rev5 addresses these security aspects as overlapping with privacy, 
but they leave it up to the designer of a system to be able to integrate the security and 
privacy controls in a way that ensures both security and privacy. 
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Table 5. Selected Security Controls that Enhance Privacy. 
Adapted from [6].  
NIST SP 800-53 rev5 Control 
ID 
Control Name 
PL-2 System Security and Privacy Plans 
IA-2 Identification and Authentication (Organizational 
Users) 
IA-3 Device Identification and Authentication 
IA-8 Identification and Authentication (Non-
Organizational Users) 
AC-24 Access Control Decision 
SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity 
 
E. CONTACT TRACING RISK ASSESSMENT 
The use of privacy threat modeling and privacy control selection are parts of a risk 
management strategy. NIST provides guidance for risk management in the form of its Risk 
Management Framework laid out in NIST SP 800-37 rev2 [19]. This publication provides 
guidance for security and privacy risk management, although only the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework has been integrated into the RMF cycle. This may be due to how new the NIST 
Privacy Framework is at the time of this writing. Regardless, NIST has established 
guidance on how to perform security and privacy risk management in NIST 800–37 rev2, 
and the NIST Privacy Framework also includes mappings to risk assessment controls in 
NIST SP 800-53 rev5. In fact, NIST SP 800-53 rev5 contains an entire family of controls 
called Risk Assessment [6]. 
NIST also provides guidance specifically on privacy risk management in its Internal 
Reprot 8062 [3]. This report goes into detail about engineering and privacy risk modeling, 
and these area contribute to NIST publishing the NIST Privacy Framework in 2020. 
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Risk Management Strategy is also a Category of the NIST Privacy Framework 
(GV.RM-P), and it provides mappings to controls that help with evaluating risk tolerance 
by way of Risk Framing (PM-28). Every organization will have its own unique risk 
tolerance that will lead to its own risk management strategy, but there are a few principles 
of risk management that all systems have in common. Since the exact details of the DON 
Contact Tracing system have not been established, it is only possible to make a general risk 
assessment of the system in its assumed configuration. 
There are two main risk management questions to answer for this system (as well 
as any system with privacy concerns). The first is whether or not the assessed risk is greater 
than the tolerable risk. Secondly, is the NIST Privacy Framework and its other associated 
references able to lead an organization to the answer to the first question? 
1. Determining Risk Based on Threats 
To answer the first question above requires a calculation with several variables 
shown below in Figure 9. This privacy risk equation is taken from the NIST Internal Report 
8062 and shows the interaction of concepts realated to privacy risk [3]. 
 
Figure 9. Risk Assessment Equation. Adapted from [3]. 
This equation uses variables taken from the Risk Assessment control family of 
NIST SP 800-53 rev5 and NIST Internal Report 8062. This calculation can be more fine-
tuned, empirical, and possibly automated in order to facilitate decision-making for the 
Authority to Operate (ATO) official, but the fundamental principles still stand. 
A rudimentary example of using a threat we identified during threat modeling is 
shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. Risk Assessment Equation Example 
For this threat to be a privacy vulnerability, an attacker would have to intercept the 
user’s Bluetooth beacons as well as the time and distance calculations determined by the 
wearable devices. This would require an adversary to obtain physical access to the 
command (within range of the Bluetooth beacons) in order to set up a collection device to 
intercept the beacons being exchanged and the data being uploaded to the collection hubs. 
The adversary would also need to have the ability to decrypt the transmissions since the 
transmissions containing time and distance calculations will likely be encrypted when 
transmitted to the collection hubs. Given this information, this makes the likelihood of this 
attack rather low. 
The impact, however, could be determined to be high because if an adversary gets 
access to a user’s social interactions via this contact tracing system, there could be several 
harmful outcomes. The adversary could use this information as part of a coercion attack if 
they can determine that the user is in the vicinity of an area or a person that they are not 
supposed to be near (e.g., restricted areas and/or fraternization). The adversary could also 
glean critical OPSEC information about a user if they can use the beacon information to 
determine that the user is always in close proximity to other identified members of the 
command. For example, they could determine that a user is always in close proximity to 
the CO or XO, and that could make this person a valuable target for surveillance, coercion, 
or even physical attack. 
Each organization will be able to come up with its own metric on how to make the 
final risk assessment, but in this example, the risk assessment would probably be 
determined to be Medium. That is based on the likelihood of occurrence being low, and 
the impact of occurrence being high. 
The next two components to the risk assessment involve the organization’s risk 
tolerance and the risk mitigation controls. The risk tolerance will differ between 
organizations so this paper cannot make an accurate determination of what the DON’s risk 
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tolerance will be. The risk tolerance may depend on external factors like how damaging 
the COVID-19 outbreak is or the sensitivity level of personnel at a command. The 
command may be willing to assume additional risk if the COVID-19 is significantly 
affecting vital operations. Another reason to assume more risk would be if the command 
in question conducts fewer sensitive operations. The social interactions of personnel at a 
command like NPS or USNA may not be as sensitive as the interpersonal interactions 
between sailors to a Carrier Strike Group. 
Regardless of the reasoning, system designers need to compare the organization’s 
risk tolerance to the risk assessment calculated above. If the risk assessment is greater than 
the risk tolerance, designers need to take action. They can either improve or modify the 
controls, or in extreme cases, they can determine that the system implementation is not 
worth the risk. The following snippet of pseudocode in Figure 11 emulates how a system 
designer should think about risk assessment versus risk tolerance. 
while (riskAssessment(threat, likelihood, impact) > riskTolerance) 
{ 
 modify controls; 
 update likelihood; 
 update impact; 
} 
Figure 11. Risk Assessment versus Risk Tolerance 
 This section serves to illustrate the general method for risk modeling needed for 
this contact tracing system. It is important because the risk modeling flows from the threat 
modeling, and this eventually leads to the application and modification of privacy controls, 
technical or otherwise. Those controls can then be integrated into privacy policies and 
procedures, which is paramount in privacy assurance. 
2. How Does the NIST Privacy Framework Operationalize a Risk 
Assessment? 
The ultimate goal of an organization using the NIST Privacy Framework should be 
the ability to develop a risk assessment that contains a list of risks and possible controls 
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that can be presented to organizational leadership and consumers alike. With the 
information derived from the framework, the entity that is approving the use of the system 
should be able to make an informed risk decision about whether the system should be 
operational in its current configuration. With the DON Contact Tracing system there is an 
inherent risk to mission accomplishment, whereas in the commercial sector, the risk is more 
monetary in nature. The question then becomes whether or not the NIST Privacy 
Framework can be operationalized in a manner that properly identifies the risks in the 
contact tracing system and provides acceptable controls to manage those risks. 
As shown in the previous sections, the threats and vulnerabilities that were 
identified in the contact tracing system could be matched to controls in NIST SP 800-53 
rev5 that would be expected to mitigate those threats and vulnerabilities to some degree. 
The process of identifying threats and vulnerabilities is far more nuanced and can be found 
mainly nestled in the Identify Core Function of the privacy framework. If a developer of 
the contact tracing system were to go down the list of Categories and Subcategories of the 
Identify Function (similar to what was done in Appendix B), he or she would come across 
some broad sweeping privacy aspects of the system in question that need to be taken into 
consideration. This would be aspects like identifying data actions, data elements, data 
ecosystems, and the processing and purpose associated with these aspects. These 
Subcategories are not sufficient to lead a developer of the contact tracing system directly 
to the specific threats. For example, the Disassociated Processing Category (CT.DP-P) is 
located under the Control Function when it should also be located under the Identify 
Function. Disassociability is one of the major concerns with this contact tracing system, 
and a huge privacy concern in all systems that collect and process private data. The 
organization’s policy on Disassociated Processing should be clearly addressed in the 
Identify Function before considering controls for it in the Control Function. The 
disassociability concerns should also be addressed in the same Functions and Categories 
that also address Risk Assessment. 
Risk Assessment is another Category under the Identify Function that, while 
necessary and important to developing a system like the contact tracing system, seems 
hidden within the framework. The entire framework should be considered as a risk 
framework for privacy. If an organization does apply the NIST Privacy Framework to a 
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system, and that organization is not any closer to an effective risk management strategy, 
then the framework has failed. Specifically, the Risk Assessment Category under the 
Identify Function probably deserves a bigger role in the framework. The Risk Assessment 
Category mentions the concepts that we described in this chapter in terms of creating a risk 
assessment, but it does not provide a tangible method to calculate this risk assessment. 
Most of that detail is left to the individual entities designing or assessing an information 
system, and that is completely acceptable due to the unique nature of most information 
systems. The main point is that risk assessment and risk management should be the goals 
of the entire framework and not just a part of it, and that should be reflected in how the 
framework is presented. 
Operationally, the NIST Privacy Framework is not as linear as it appears. It appears 
to take an approach that involves identifying concerns, creating a risk assessment, and 
implementing controls (mainly security controls). While the cyclic nature of these 
processes in likely implied by the framework, it would be valuable to emphasize the cyclic 
structure of risk management. NIST should constantly be referencing its famous RMF 
guidance while talking about its privacy framework since they are both ongoing cyclic 
processes that require users to revisit aspects of the assessment for reevaluation. Figure 12 
shows the cyclic nature of risk assessment by mapping categories in the privacy framework 




Figure 12. NIST RMF and NIST Privacy Framework Mapping 
NIST states in its “Roadmap for Advancing the NIST Privacy Framework: A Tool 
for Improving Privacy through Enterprise Risk Management” that the “privacy domain 
lacks development and uptake of uniform concepts of privacy risk assessment, including 
specific risk factors, as well as more in-depth guidance and tools for assessing privacy 
risks” [22]. This acknowledgement goes to show that NIST understands that privacy risk 
assessment is a challenging endeavor right now, and many organizations do not know how 
to integrate privacy risk management into their current risk management approaches. In the 
context of the DON Contact Tracing system, the privacy framework can be operationalized 
to a degree, but it is up to skilled technologists and policy makers to understand how the 
priorities of their individual system before just going down the privacy framework like it 
is some type of compliance checklist. NIST has provided an invaluable resource to use in 
privacy risk assessment, it just needs to be placed in the right context when designing or 
assessing an information system. 
Ultimately, the NIST Privacy Framework does accomplish its purpose which is to 
help organizations manage privacy risks. The degree of effectiveness of that claim is yet to 
be seen as the NIST Privacy Framework is still relatively new (it was released in January 
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2020). The NIST Privacy Framework gives developers and assessors a list of problems to 
consider and provides a rudimentary roadmap to controls that may solve those problems. 
Although the NIST Privacy Framework is not mandatory for federal agencies, ideally one 
would imagine that a proper application of the framework should be enough to certify that 
a system is within the limits of acceptable privacy risk for an organization. This also might 
not be the case since there are nuanced policy and technology aspects that may need to be 
considered when applying this framework. The next chapter goes into more depth about 
some of the pressing issues regarding privacy risk in the contact tracing system that were 
revealed by the risk modeling in this chapter, including disassociability, privacy policy, 
and security controls that require a deeper understanding about how they are applied within 
the system. 
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V. DON CONTACT TRACING SYSTEM ASSESSMENT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter uses the findings from the previous chapter on privacy risk modeling 
to provide an assessment and make recommendations about the DON Contact Tracing 
System. These recommendations are meant to be broad and somewhat overarching since 
the system is not currently in place and the exact details of the system are not currently 
known; however, these recommendations must still be considered when implementing an 
information system that collects, processes, and transmits private data in a manner such as 
the one described in Chapter II. 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUND PRIVACY POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES 
Above everything else, the threat and risk modeling of the contact tracing system 
brought to light the need for a well-developed privacy policy that takes into account privacy 
risk when implementing appropriate technical controls. Digital privacy revolves around the 
responsible use of data, and having tailored privacy policies and procedures in place 
ensures that organizations are taking the most effective steps toward being responsible with 
data about individuals. Privacy policy can be used to inform users of a system or app about 
how data about them will be collected, stored, and processed. Privacy policy can also 
specify how users can interact or control these data actions when they involve their 
personal data. Most privacy policies are designed in some way that complies with a legal 
regulation such as the GDPR or HIPAA. The DOD, DHA, and DON all have privacy 
offices that provide their own broad privacy policies and procedures that are applicable to 
their respective organizations, but since every system is unique, there should be more 
guidance on the data actions of the DON Contact Tracing System. 
As mentioned in Chapter III, all DOD systems that collect, store, or process PII 
require a PIA. PIAs are a useful tool mainly from a legal standpoint, but information 
systems also require detailed procedures for ensuring technical privacy controls are 
implemented in such a way that risk is mitigated to the maximum extent possible. If a 
privacy policy does not properly take into account the appropriate risk management factors 
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(discussed in Chapter IV) when implementing controls, even the most advanced and well-
tested controls may be ineffective at protecting privacy. For example, having a policy that 
states that all contact tracing data will be de-identified before being uploaded to the DON 
enterprise cloud architecture may be an ineffective policy. As it is phrased, this policy 
would not take into account the loss of utility if the data were uploaded with missing 
identifiers. This policy also does not account for the risk in re-identifying the data. The 
ability to re-identify data is always present (see Section B), and the privacy policy and 
procedures should be clear about what specifically should be done in order to ensure data 
is de-identified and to what extent does it need to be de-identified (i.e., which identifiers or 
quasi-identifiers need to be removed in order to fall below the risk threshold established by 
the organization?). 
Another consideration for framing DON privacy policy for its contact tracing 
system is the difference between the DON mission focus and the focus of commercial 
concerns. The DON is less concerned than businesses about the monetization its data in 
terms of selling data to third parties; the DON does not have the problem faced by 
businesses of losing customers due to privacy policy or breaches of that policy. Instead, 
the DON can center its attention on the individual rights and dignity of the users and more 
broadly on which privacy policy will best facilitate accomplishment of the DON’s mission. 
The privacy policy should instill trust in its users assuming that the second order effect of 
this trust will lead to a mission-ready workforce, for which an important precondition is 
keeping the spread of COVID-19 at bay. The following sections delve deeper into an areas 
of concern identified in Chapter IV. 
B. A POLICY FOR DISASSOCIABILITY 
Disassociability, a term taken from the NIST Privacy Framework, is used in this 
paper to include both de-identification and anonymization. Both of these terms sound 
similar, but sometimes they are described as having slightly different meanings. According 
to [49], de-identification specifically involves the explicit process of removing identifiers 
from a dataset, whereas anonymization is not a method or process but more of an end goal 
of a combination of methods or processes. In other words, anonymization is the desired 
end result of de-identification if done properly. NIST claims that these terms are sometimes 
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used interchangeably, but NIST also acknowledges that sometime anonymization denotes 
an unreversible type of de-identification [50]. 
This research mainly focuses on de-identification of data over anonymization for 
use in applying the privacy framework to the assess the risk posed by the contact tracing 
system. The term de-identification is less ambiguous than anonymization. De-
identification is also integral to performing data actions on PII. 
NIST has conducted extensive research on de-identification of personal data in 
governmental datasets. The results of that research needs to be used to inform the privacy-
related requirements for the DON contact tracing system [43], [50]. The focal point of the 
NIST-conducted research was on making these datasets releasable for research while 
simultaneously protecting the privacy of the citizens whose data is in these datasets. With 
the contact tracing data, if it is re-identified to be stored with other medical data about the 
users, this data will need to be de-identified again in order to make it available to research 
entities that are either internal or external to the DOD. 
The research conducted on de-identification by NIST is a valuable reference for all 
things surrounding de-identifying data at the federal level, but it is also important to take 
into consideration the stance on de-identification by two of the most prominent pieces of 
privacy, the GDPR and HIPAA. Both the GDPR and HIPAA have different standards of 
de-identified data. The GDPR takes a spectrum approach and defines levels of de-
identification as Identified, Identifiable, Article 11 De-identified, and 
Anonymous/Aggregated [51]. This is a useful approach in theory because it has been 
shown that re-identification is possible to achieve by leveraging MI/AL techniques [52]. 
While this does have implications for classifying de-identification standards within the 
different GDPR de-identification levels, it does show that the GDPR acknowledges that 
de-identification is not strictly binary like one would see with HIPAA de-identification 
standards [53]. When applying the GDPR spectrum-based approach to de-identification, it 
gives more justification to the risk-management approach of privacy which in turn implies 
that the levels of de-identification need to be continually updated based on advances in 
computing that change the risk calculation. 
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HIPAA takes a more binary approach and considers de-identified data to no longer 
be private data, and therefore no longer falls under HIPAA protection. This means that data 
that has been properly de-identified in accordance with HIPAA standards can be shared 
with research organizations that are not covered entities. To the credit of HIPAA, the 
legislation does provide a robust standard for de-identification. This includes the following 
two methods: the Safe Harbor method, where 18 types of identifiers are removed and the 
Expert Determination method where an expert assesses whether information has been de-
identified below a particular risk threshold based on the application of statistical and 
scientific principles [49]. 
Understanding the HIPAA standard of de-identification is important for the contact 
tracing system, not only because the contact tracing data might be linked to HIPAA data at 
some point in the data life cycle, but also because of how the HIPAA means of de-
identification will affect the utility of the data. Contact tracing data does not fit squarely 
into any of the 18 types of identifiers that are removed in the Safe Harbor method [53]. It 
has already been proven that valuable social information can be determined by Bluetooth 
data, which in this case is the proximity data provided by the contact tracing system [38]. 
This makes it vital that the DHA and DON determine a standard by which contact tracing 
data can be shared within the DOD enterprise while limiting the risk of re-identification 
and while still maintaining an acceptable level of data utility. 
The discussion about GDPR and HIPAA standards on de-identification serves to 
illustrate the point that disassociation needs to be dealt with in much more complex terms 
than the NIST Privacy Framework leads a user to believe. It involves more than just 
stripping names from spreadsheets and encrypting data. Privacy assurance, as stated in 
Chapter IV, is how policy and procedures handle the intersection of disassociability and 
security controls; therefore, these policies and procedures need to be tailored to a specific 
system like the contact tracing system. The following paragraphs present some 
recommendations specific to the DON Contact Tracing System that should be weighed 
when developing a policy or standard for disassociation of user data. 
First, the DON needs to acknowledge that the contact tracing data is sensitive 
information in terms of disassociability regardless of whether or not it is directly associated 
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with identifiers or quasi-identifiers. Therefore, it should be protected to the greatest extent 
possible when stored or transferred within the system. Even though identifiers are not 
linked to the contact tracing data when collected, Bluetooth proximity data can be used to 
infer social graphs [38]. There is the aspect of deniability since it is difficult to associate a 
Bluetooth Identifier to a user with 100% certainty, but the social graphs that can be inferred 
still represent a threat to privacy and to command OPSEC since operations can also be 
inferred. 
The DON needs a plan for dealing with mappings to Bluetooth Identifiers in the 
system. The original configuration has several nodes where the contact tracing data can be 
re-identified or linked to a user directly. The first time would be when the individual 
commands issue the devices to employees. That command will maintain a mapping in order 
to keep track of the devices, and this will be stored in the cloud services provided by the 
device vendor. The other location where users will likely be re-identified is in their medical 
records at BUMED. This has implications for data use since the contact tracing data is not 
considered PHI before it reaches BUMED. It also raises concerns about who is able to 
access the contact tracing data at each command. This leaves room for abuse if a Division 
Officer or Division Chief Petty Officer can access the collected data and make a 
determination about whether or not a Sailor has been spending enough time in his or her 
assigned workspace. To remedy these issues, each command should have Navy Medical 
issue the contact tracing devices and have all of the contact tracing data route directly to 
BUMED databases (see Figure 13 for a visual representation of the proposed chain of 
custody of contact tracing data). This will remove the temptation for misuse as well as 
simplify the data flow. With all the information going directly to BUMED, the data will 
begin as PHI before any entity has had a chance to analyze the data. This also requires that 
the contact tracing device vendor provide a system that does little to no minimal backend 
processing before pushing the data to BUMED. 
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Figure 13. Chain of Custody of Contact Tracing Data through BUMED 
Pushing all the contact data directly to BUMED will make the data PHI and subject 
to HIPAA regulations regarding de-identification. This is where the most crucial de-
identification decisions need to be made as this contact tracing data has the potential to be 
shared within the DON Jupiter system for analysis and reporting purposes. There are two 
options in this scenario, and they are either sharing the data after it has been de-identified 
appropriately or conducting all analysis under the purview of BUMED and only sharing 
the results of the analysis in a manner where there is a low risk of reverse engineering the 
result to re-identify either organizations or individuals.  
In the first case, sharing the contact tracing data will probably require the Expert 
Determination method since this method requires a more blatant risk assessment method 
in appraising the risk of re-identification. Contact tracing data is linked to privacy more so 
than characteristics like medical conditions because relations, actions, and locations can be 
inferred from the contact tracing data. This means that contact tracing data is not only a 
privacy risk to individuals, but also to commands and the military at large. For this reason, 
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an expert(s) should be required to determine the method of de-identification required 
before sharing the data by conducting a tailored risk assessment for this specific type of 
data (for more on making risk assessments, see Chapter IV). 
In the second case where data is processed and analyzed within BUMED, 
researchers need to take caution when sending analyzed data downstream in the data path 
because certain analyzed data may have the potential to leak identifying information about 
individuals or commands. Risk of follow on uses of data is not considered in the NIST 
Privacy Framework, but it should be applicable in this contact tracing system. For example, 
a detailed analysis of a command’s COVID-19 risk mitigation strategies using contact 
tracing data could reveal private information about the command or individuals at the 
command. If a ship that has ten Sailors that work in the same department, seven of them 
contract COVID-19, and those seven Sailors were not social distancing effectively enough 
according to their contact tracing data, it would give anyone a 70% chance of guessing who 
has COVID-19 in that department as long as they can recover a list of the 10 people 
working in that department. Even though the personal information has been removed from 
that report, the results of the analysis may lead to re-identification. This is a primarily a 
threat to OPSEC since adversaries may be able to leverage this information they have on 
Sailors and commands. Maybe the risk of potentially exposing those seven Sailors’ 
diagnosis is a risk the DON is willing to take in order to curb the spread of the disease, but 
this is a determination that needs to be made by experts that understand risk assessment in 
the privacy space as it concerns force readiness and OPSEC. 
These recommendations all come back to policy and procedures. The technology 
for de-identification is not perfect and every de-identified data set is at some risk of re-
identification. This is why it is incumbent on the part of privacy experts to be involved in 
the process of risk assessment and policy making when it comes to disassociation of these 
contact tracing data sets. In other words, there are privacy requirements for disassociation. 
Privacy experts must also represent the interests of privacy as system engineers formulate 
tradeoffs among the dependability attributes of the system, such as safety and security. 
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C. SECURITY REQUIRMENTS FOR PRIVACY  
It is well known in privacy research circles that security can exist without privacy, 
but privacy may not be able to exist without security. The risk assessment documented in 
Chapter IV reinforces that need for security in order to maintain privacy of an employee’s 
contact tracing data. Security controls are necessary in the contact tracing system in order 
to ensure privacy especially in the areas of data collection and access control when the data 
is stored.  
In the area of access control, it was already recommended earlier that the contact 
tracing devices and their user device mappings only be overseen by the medical staff at 
each command. While this aids in disassociability, it is also a recommendation that limits 
access control and limits the number of personnel that are allowed to view this contact 
tracing data and are able to re-identify it. Minimizing the number of personnel with access 
to the re-identified data aligns with the principle of least privilege which in this case is seen 
as both a security and a privacy control. 
The other recommendation that comes from the risk assessment of this contact 
tracing system is the need for confidentiality commensurate with the level of sensitivity of 
the contact tracing data. The collected data is sensitive regardless of whether or not it has 
been re-identified. This is why cybersecurity measures, such as employing end-to-end 
encryption, should play a significant role from the point where the data is collected to the 
point where the data is secure in BUMED and Jupiter databases. The cybersecurity 
measures need to ensure it is difficult for an ease dropper or man-in-the-middle to identify 
patterns in the transmitted data that might reveal serial numbers of the devices or other 
sensitive information like proximity or time data. 
Thankfully, this endeavor is already being undertaken by engineers at Naval Sea 
Systems Command (NSWC) Crane Division. NSWC Crane was tasked with identifying 
security flaws in any contact tracing system that the DON is researching for procurement. 
This is essential, not only for security, but also for privacy; however, ensuring secure 
communications in a system in not enough for putting the privacy stamp of approval on 
the system. This is evident by the previous section on disassociability recommendations. 
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Security controls cannot account for all the privacy assurance in an information system, 
and in many cases, security is used as a substitute for privacy. 
A recommendation for DON engineers is to conduct dedicated privacy testing (in 
addition to security testing) in regard to information system procurement. This would push 
the DON to place a higher weight on the technological controls for privacy while 
combining them with the regulatory/policy controls that the DON already implements with 
its privacy program. Privacy compliance is moving closer to the front of conversations 
about personal data much in the same way cybersecurity has taken a prominent role in the 
conversation surrounding national security. It would be beneficial for the DON to get ahead 
of this movement and begin establishing a division in the privacy office that deals with 
privacy technologies and assessments of privacy technologies. 
Additionally, to aid the privacy assessment of this contact tracing system, it will 
require a test bed to ensure privacy is being preserved during operations. To its credit, the 
DON was planning on using the United States Naval Academy as their testing grounds for 
the system. It was to be conducted on a voluntary basis, and its purpose was to test the 
operation of the system. While this type of real-world testing is valuable to ensure proper 
operation of the system, that also includes ensuring the system is secure and privacy 
preserving. Based on the leadership’s description of the contact tracing system being tested, 
many of the midshipmen were apprehensive to take part in the test since their biggest 
concern was privacy. The midshipmen’s concern centered on the ability of the system to 
track their movements in such a way that inferences about their activities could lead to 
administrative repercussions. Another concern is that the privacy controls in the pilot 
system might be ineffective. Security has little to do with alleviating these fears because 
access controls and confidentiality controls that are intact can still lead to breaches of the 
individual’s privacy. This is another instance where privacy policy takes the lead, and the 
mixture of a risk-informed privacy policy with appropriate and tested disassociability and 
security controls should be able to alleviate these concerns and privacy gaps under a chosen 
risk threshold. Removing fear is in part related to addressing uncertainty and being able to 
inform users about actual versus perceived risk. 
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The reaction of these apprehensive midshipmen is the reaction that the DON should 
want to see. The workforce itself needs to become more privacy conscious and provide 
feedback like this to system developers. This is why pilot studies, testbeds, and 
stakeholder-feedback sessions are vital to achieving privacy goals and objectives of the 
DON. They provide the foundation for making a risk assessment like what was documented 
in Chapter IV. The system being implemented can be tailored to fit the security and privacy 
needs of the DON based on that risk assessment. 
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
In addition to providing justification for risk-informed policies and procedures 
surrounding disassociability and security, the risk modeling in Chapter IV revealed the 
need for the DON, first and foremost, to quantify its risk tolerance when assessing or 
designing an information system like this contact tracing system. Many manufacturers of 
digital contact tracing systems will make claims like “Privacy Guaranteed” or “Completely 
Secure” which any technologist should see that as a marketing ploy aimed at convincing 
customers that this company has taken sufficient steps to ensure security and privacy. A 
knowledgeable designer or engineer should recognize that there is no such thing as perfect 
security or perfect privacy in practice. Companies will claim that removing identifiers 
ensures one hundred percent privacy or that providing encryption will also guarantee 
privacy. This research has already mentioned that de-identification is not a perfect privacy-
preserving solution, and that security controls do not address all aspects of privacy. 
This is where risk modeling and risk assessment comes into play. Reverse 
engineering a contact tracing system in order to find security flaws is vital to the process 
of procurement and ensuring privacy as well, but it is not enough in ensuring overall 
privacy in the system. This comes from first establishing the threats/vulnerabilities, their 
likelihood, and their impact while simultaneously determining the risk tolerance of the 
organization. Without this assessment the designer of a system would not be able to 
determine the extent to which a chosen control will lower the risk, and they will also not 
have a risk tolerance to compare it to. In turn, there would be no informed basis for 
choosing which controls from the NIST Privacy Framework to implement. 
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This brings the conversation back to the companies that sell cyber snake oil. Policy 
makers and system developers need to ignore those claims and see privacy as more than 
just a technical solution or a policy solution and more as the intersection of technical 
mechanisms and policy implementations that are backed by risk determinations. Whether 
or not the NIST Privacy Framework is the best tool to make these determinations is 








VI. NIST PRIVACY FRAMEWORK ASSESSMENT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The NIST Privacy Framework is certainly a step in the right direction in the realms 
digital privacy and software and system engineering. By NIST’s own admission, the real 
value of the NIST Privacy Framework is, or at least should be, facilitating communication 
between technologists and c-suite and opening a dialogue about privacy and its impacts 
when designing systems, products, and services [1]. This dialogue brought on by this 
framework should inevitably lead to a determination of risk tolerance and a risk assessment 
for the organization in regard to privacy. 
On this path to a privacy risk assessment, there are several aspects of the NIST 
Privacy Framework that need to be addressed and either emphasized or clarified in order 
to better illuminate this path. This chapter revisits the privacy and security relationship as 
it pertains to the actual framework and whether or not the cybersecurity and privacy 
frameworks should be separate documents. It also discusses the checklist nature of the 
framework and how effectively this translates to a privacy risk assessment. Finally, this 
chapter dives into the privacy framework as an identification tool and explores some of the 
constraints regarding its application. 
A. PRIVACY AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK INTEGRATION 
The last chapter detailed the need for security controls in the contact tracing system 
in order to ensure privacy. Privacy can and does require security centric controls, but just 
implementing security controls does not always ensure a tolerable level of privacy risk. 
Security only ensures that unauthorized users cannot view data that they are not supposed 
to be able to access. It does nothing to protect against inferring information from data that 
authorized users have access too, and security sometimes does not control what users can 
do with data sets after they are granted access to them (i.e., being able to re-identify 
individuals in an anonymized data set that has been released to the public). 
The NIST Privacy Framework upholds this relationship between Privacy and 
Security, by including a Protect Function that focuses on data security, but this does not 
quite capture the full essence of the privacy-security relationship. In all likelihood, NIST 
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might have included this Core Function to ensure that users of the framework know that 
security is necessary for privacy in many instances. The issue here is that there already 
exists a NIST Cybersecurity Framework that includes this same function as well as similar 
subcategories [20]. 
The two frameworks intentionally have a similar structure so that they can be used 
concurrently to analyze risk for systems that have requirements for privacy and security, 
and this raises the following question: Should there be two frameworks or just one? The 
answer to this question is based on the degree to which a practitioner believes privacy and 
security should either be isolated or coupled, and this is the crucial dilemma that needs to 
be reevaluated by NIST. 
The prevailing thought of this research is that the privacy and cybersecurity 
frameworks should be included under one framework that developers and engineers can 
tailor to the system depending on the level of privacy or security needed for that system. 
In this setup, it is harder to completely decouple them, and it is easier to leverage the 
concepts together toward a common goal. This is not to say that security needs to be 
considered with every application of privacy. This was seen in the previous chapter when 
referring to disassociability and how security sometimes can have little impact on this 
aspect of privacy. The combining of the two frameworks would represent how the two 
concepts are related but the different Functions and Categories would be able to represent 
how security and privacy challenges can be isolated in certain contexts. The degree of 
decoupling is determined by the organization using the framework, not by the fact that 
there currently exist two different NIST frameworks. 
There already appears to be an overlap between the two frameworks with the 
Identify and Protect Functions (see Figure 14). The Functions that do not overlap include 
Govern, Control, and Communicate for the privacy framework and Detect, Respond, and 
Recover for the cybersecurity framework. These appear to all be Functions that could assist 




Figure 14. Overlap between the Cybersecurity and Privacy Frameworks. 
Source: [1]. 
Privacy engineers need to be able to respond to privacy breaches in a similar fashion 
to how organizations respond to security breaches. Sometimes these two types of breaches 
may be the result of the same event; therefore, it would make sense if the same framework 
were to be used when implementing privacy and security controls. Even the privacy 
framework Functions of Govern, Control, and Communicate would be beneficial to the 
security posture of a system. The security profile of an organization should be planned, 
deliberate, and a topic of discussion at the executive/c-suite level in the same manner as 
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privacy. Security, in the same manner as privacy, should not be isolated to only the 
technical advisors of an organization since the upper-level management aids in setting the 
risk tolerance of the organization, and this risk tolerance plays into the security profile as 
well. This reinforces why the cybersecurity of an organization could also benefit from 
applying some of the principles of the privacy framework. 
While the integration of the two frameworks would be beneficial in terms 
leveraging more resources to tackle security and privacy issues that are largely interrelated, 
it would also add more simplicity to the federal development process since it would be 
easier to more seamlessly integrate one existing framework into an already established 
RMF process. When NIST SP 800-53 rev5 was released in September 2020, the main 
overall revision was that more emphasis was added to privacy specific controls [6]. NIST 
did not create a new Special Publication just for privacy controls and keep SP 800–53 for 
security-only controls. Whether or not this was just the easier solution, it still reinforces 
that privacy and security controls belong in the same space since there is overlap between 
the two. 
NIST has been integrating the Cybersecurity Framework Functions and Categories 
into SP 800–53 rev5 as part of the controls. It may be only a matter of time before NIST 
begins integrating Functions and Categories of the privacy framework as well. It would 
certainly simplify the process for developers and engineers to be able to utilize one NIST 
framework and one NIST Special Publication that contains what is needed for both privacy 
and security risk assessments. 
In the same vein as SP 800–53 rev5 including references to the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework, SP 800–37 rev2 (“Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and 
Organizations”) released in December 2018 includes how the cybersecurity framework can 
be aligned with the RMF. Under Executive Order 13800, it is mandatory that federal 
agencies use the cybersecurity framework in conjunction with the RMF process [19]. The 
RMF Special Publication was updated before the NIST Privacy Framework was released 
in 2020, but it likely to only be a matter of time before the privacy framework is also 
required by executive order and SP 800–37 gets updated to include references to the NIST 
Privacy Framework. If the two frameworks were to be combined, it would allow for a 
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smoother integration into existing processes, and it would likely enhance the development 
of secure and private systems. 
It is evident that NIST and the rest of the U.S. government have decoupled security 
and privacy from one another to some degree, but that does not seem to be fully intentional. 
It seems that cybersecurity was an issue that was tackled first, and then NIST began to 
work on privacy in a somewhat separate time and space. This is understandable as these 
represent relatively emerging technological issues; however, when the dust settles, it will 
become clearer that in this case less is more and that the frameworks would be consolidated 
into one “Risk Assessment Framework for Security and Privacy.” Fundamentally, this 
reflects the idea that security and privacy are interrelated but still allows the distinction 
between the two concepts to be seen clearly based on developers’ risk assessments of the 
application of the system being designed. From a practical standpoint, this reflects a better 
consolidation and integration of a single framework into already established federal 
documentation on risk management, security, and privacy. 
B. THE CHECKLIST NATURE OF THE FRAMEWORK 
Another aspect of the framework that warrants more clarification and discussion is 
the checklist nature of building target profiles using the framework. The privacy framework 
is set up in such a manner that a team of designers could scroll down the list of Functions, 
Categories, and Subcategories—checking off each row of the spread sheet after they have 
visited it and assessed that line item’s value to their organization. This is not the ideal way 
to use the framework, nor was it the intended way that NIST envisioned that the framework 
would be used. Ideally, an organization has taken the responsibility to determine their own 
risk tolerance outside of applying the framework and make its privacy assessments based 
on the unique implementation of whatever system the organization is implementing (as 
mentioned in Chapter IV on risk modeling). In this case, the organization would use the 
privacy framework as a guide to further open up the privacy conversation and help identify 
any privacy issues that might have slipped through the cracks. 
One of the problems with having the NIST Privacy Framework set up in a checklist 
fashion is that organizations might see this as a way to remove the responsibility of 
experienced privacy engineers. If one were to complete the privacy framework “checklist-
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style,” then they would assume that they have identified any and all privacy issues related 
to the system. While the privacy framework is adept at identifying certain privacy issues 
indirectly, it is incorrect to assume that every privacy issue becomes transparent or enters 
the privacy conversation based on an application of the framework. The NIST Privacy 
Framework does not claim to provide a roadmap to perfect or even near-perfect privacy; it 
only serves to help organizations take privacy into account when designing systems by 
promoting communication about privacy and encouraging collaboration [1]. 
This checklist type of thinking is problematic because of the prevalence of 
checklists in federal organizations—especially the military. The military gravitates toward 
checklists. Aviation fields use checklists for a wide variety of tasks. The assumption is that 
if the checklist is complete and all parameterized values are within the acceptable limits, 
then the task either has been or will be completed successfully. This mechanism obviously 
differs from the NIST Privacy Framework, but to what extent? The inexperienced 
practitioner would like a checklist that they would apply to the privacy space, and the 
results of that checklist would output whether a system is within the acceptable privacy 
limits. Unfortunately, privacy risk and privacy compliance are usually not that precise and 
hardly ever results in a binary outcome. 
This becomes even more problematic when the desire for a military-style checklist 
manifests itself in the form of a compliance checklist. A pilot cannot take off until he or 
she has completed the take-off checklist successfully. It would not be too hard to imagine 
organizations in the federal government making the NIST Privacy Framework or some 
kind of equivalent framework mandatory for privacy compliance. This could quickly 
devolve into engineers and developers applying the framework like a checklist rather than 
a mechanism for awareness and discussion, and the results could be disastrous. It could 
also engender a practice of gaming the checklist, or even result in a proliferation of requests 
for waivers for completing the checklist or addressing specific items on the checklist. 
In order to ensure that the NIST Privacy Framework remains just what it is, a 
framework and not a checklist, there are several steps that should be taken. The first step 
is to ensure that the NIST Privacy Framework remains voluntary for all organizations. The 
voluntary nature of the framework encourages analysis and discussion of privacy issues 
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whereas an involuntary application of the framework would likely lead to checklist type 
compliance. 
The next step would be for NIST to emphasize the non-parameterized nature of 
privacy. They need to ensure it is clear that different people and organizations will apply 
the framework over a variety of situations which makes this different than a pilot applying 
a preflight checklist to an airframe where the outputs are easily calculated and quantified. 
Privacy compliance with the NIST Privacy Framework depends completely on an 
organization’s dedication to ensure privacy to the maximum extent possible without overly 
impeding the organization’s ability to fulfil it intended purpose. The privacy framework 
needs to clarify that privacy engineering is not an exact science or a binary problem. Like 
all forms of engineering, it is concerned with building systems and apps to engineering-
tolerance and making engineering tradeoff decisions. 
C. THE FRAMEWORK AS A RISK IDENTIFICATION TOOL 
While the NIST Privacy Framework is a valuable resource for system engineers 
and developers, its usefulness lies in its support for identifying certain broad privacy issues, 
raising awareness about privacy issues, and offering guidance on implementing controls to 
manage privacy risks through risk-mitigation measures. The privacy framework admittedly 
was made to be flexible to accommodate different types of technologies and organizations, 
bringing into question the efficacy of applying the framework. An overarching question 
would be whether someone can use the framework to identify privacy issues for 
organizations and translate these issues into impacts or what needs to be done to fix them. 
The following sections examine questions that the privacy framework should strive to 
answer. These questions represent some of the core aspects of the framework, and as such, 
they provide valuable insight into the effectiveness of the framework as revealed by 
different case studies, to include this one on the DON Contact Tracing System.  
1. Does it identify failures of the worst kind? 
The ultimate goal of any risk mitigation framework is to identify the potential 
failures of the worst kind. Catastrophic failures that result in privacy breaches (and most 
times security breaches) affect companies’ bottom lines, and in the case of the military, 
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they affect the ability to carry out the mission. An example would be a flaw in the design 
of a system that allows a certain unauthorized user to view customers’ private data, which 
would be an issue, but this issue’s impact could be magnified exponentially if this 
unauthorized user has the access where they can digitally download all of this private data 
and export it to third parties. Now a flaw that allowed one unauthorized user to view private 
data has been turned into a more severe privacy breach—the mass exfiltration of private 
data. 
Could the use of the NIST Privacy Framework have resulted identifying that such 
a failure could occur? The NIST Privacy Framework does identify access controls as a 
form of privacy mechanism in the “Identity Management, Authentication and Access 
Control (PR.AC-P)” Category under the Protect (PR-P) Function; however, just because 
the framework identifies access controls as a privacy control, it provides little insight into 
how access controls should be implemented in order to the avoid the most catastrophic 
privacy failures of a system [1]. This aligns with the claim that the framework is in the 
simplest terms an identification tool; that is, the framework serves as guidance, but there 
is a considerable amount of work that needs to be done by the organization to define the 
impacts for privacy issues identified when applying the framework. Hiller and Russell 
share this concern in [54] by pointing out that the privacy framework assumes an 
organization will do all the work of determining impacts and likelihood before applying 
the framework. 
A well-known modern-day example of a privacy breach that is not related to 
security was the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal. The British political 
consulting firm Cambridge Analytica influenced the 2016 U.S. election using personality 
profiles on Americans. The profiles were built using Facebook user data. The issue was 
that the data was obtained by Cambridge Analytica in what some would classify as a 
nefarious manner as many of the users unknowingly disclosed data about themselves and 
their Facebook friends. Since this event was strongly tied to a U.S. election, the unveiling 
of the creation and use of those personality profiles was instrumental in bringing digital 
privacy into the consciousness of the layperson and exposing privacy issues faced by Big 
Tech [55]. 
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An article from Wired magazine claims that the CEO of Facebook was aware in 
2012 of third-party apps collecting data on Facebook users’ unwitting friends, but he did 
not see this as a significant risk to the company [55]. Facebook as well as the rest of the 
world now knows that it was a huge risk—one could say it was an unwarranted risk, both 
for the company and the users of Facebook. The point of this example is to illustrate that 
the NIST Privacy Framework is not complete in its guidance on identifying the severity of 
risk. Facebook’s CEO saw a risk but did not foresee a huge impact over the horizon. 
Hopefully, use of the privacy framework would have helped to identify a risk like this one, 
but it is hard to imagine that the framework would have given any insight into the impact 
of the risk. That is the responsibility of the executives, engineers, and developers applying 
the framework. In addition, it is one thing to identify a risk, but it is another to do a good 
job of characterizing the risk in terms of severity and probability of occurrence. 
The answer to the question of whether or not the NIST Privacy Framework provides 
adequate guidance for identifying all possible privacy failures at all levels of severity is no. 
NIST does not claim that its privacy framework will assist the user of the framework in 
determining the severity of a privacy risk; there is no silver bullet or one-size-fits-all 
solution, in either in privacy or security engineering. That aspect is left up to the executives, 
engineers, and developers. It should be made clearer that since the framework is more of 
an identification tool, it does little to illuminate the impacts of either privacy failures or 
privacy controls. 
2. How does the framework lead from a policy control to a technical control? 
The framework does not directly address how an established privacy policy can 
lead to technical controls. If the NIST Privacy Framework is going to provide value as a 
risk assessment tool, it needs to provide guidance on the appropriate technical controls 
being implemented. The DOD, DON, and DHA have privacy offices that implement 
privacy policies. In theory, the major tenets of these privacy policies should be able to be 
input into risk assessment tools that are based on the NIST Privacy Framework. Those tools 
should provide as output recommendations for technical controls that satisfy these policies 
(see Figure 15). While this is a simplified, black box scenario, the principle still holds. The 
question is whether the NIST Privacy Framework accomplishes this task. 
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Figure 15. Desired Outcome of Privacy Frameworks and Risk Assessment 
Tools. 
The DOD Instruction 5400.11 “DOD Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs” would 
be an appropriate case study for this question [23]. One of the Fair Information Practice 
Principles (FIPPs) that the DOD considers when evaluating information systems is 
minimization. While this is an open-ended tenet of most privacy policies, it is necessary 
for all DOD information systems. This means that the NIST Privacy Framework should 
recommend technical controls that implement this policy aspect. 
If one were to scan through the NIST Privacy Framework, he or she would see the 
Data Processing Management Category under the Control Function. This category offers 
NIST SP 800-53 rev5 controls like event logging, monitoring, access control, and audit 
record review to aid in minimization of data in accordance with an organization’s risk 
strategy. This represents the current granularity of the technical controls provided by the 
NIST Privacy Framework. It is the responsibility of the engineers and developers to apply 
these NIST SP 800-53 rev5 controls to the system being developed. 
To answer the question whether the NIST Privacy Framework provides a link from 
policy to technical controls revolves around how specific engineers and developers expect 
these technical controls to be. Being a mechanism for identification, the framework will 
identify some broad technical controls that should accomplish the task that reflects the 
language in the privacy policy. One of the downsides to the framework is that it is currently 
only mapped to NIST SP 800-53 rev5 controls. The cybersecurity framework maps to 
controls from several different organizations in addition to the NIST SP 800-53 rev5. When 
more mappings have been added, the privacy framework will be more capable of 
translating policy controls to technical controls, but it is still important to point out that 
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these technical controls are useless without trained and experienced engineers and 
developers to implement them based on a sound risk strategy by their organization. 
3. The system is not 100% private. Here are the risks. Do you accept the 
risks? 
It has been established that there is no such thing as 100% privacy (or 100% security 
for that matter); privacy is assured through assessing the threats, the likelihood of those 
threats (i.e., frequency), the impact (i.e., severity) of those threats, and applying a risk 
determination based on the controls implemented to mitigate those threats. It is also a 
matter of there being an exploitable associated vulnerability that the threat actor can 
employ. This is the idea behind this final question about accepting privacy risks and the 
extent to which the NIST Privacy Framework exposes these risks and allows leadership to 
make informed decisions about the implementation of an information system like the DON 
Contact Tracing System. 
As stated earlier, the privacy framework can help identify issues relating to privacy; 
it cannot determine likelihood or impact. Those are determined by each organization 
regarding each of their information systems. The privacy framework may be used to 
determine that the organization has an inadequate risk strategy, but it is ultimately up to 
that organization to reconcile that strategy with the needs of the organization and/or 
consumers. For example, Subcategory Identify, Risk Assessment (ID.RA-P) maps to NIST 
SP 800-53 rev5 controls for Risk Assessment (RA-3) and Privacy Impact Assessments 
(RA-8). The framework exists to “remind” organizations to ensure these controls exist and 
are adequate, but the control guide cannot provide extensive details on how these controls 
can be the most effective since each organization has different needs and resources. The 
framework cannot determine impact; it can only ensure the organization consider the 
impact and make the determination themselves. 
Unlike impact or likelihood, the actual risks can be discovered by applying the 
privacy framework and implementing some of the privacy/security controls that are 
recommended. The privacy framework, under Identify, Data Processing Ecosystem Risk 
Management (ID.DE-P), maps to control SA-11 which is Developer Testing and 
Evaluation. One of the key components of ensuring the trustworthiness of a system (in 
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terms of either privacy or security) is to have a robust and extensive testing and evaluation 
program. This control could either identify that a current testing program is not adequate 
in terms of testing for privacy, or it could reveal other privacy issues during testing that 
need to be dealt with further. 
Moreover, the answer to the question is that it depends. The NIST Privacy 
Framework cannot be used to directly obtain a full risk determination by the organization 
using it. Although there may be a temptation to use the framework as checklist as a means 
of compliance, it is not advisable to do so. The framework can be used to identify certain 
risks, but since it cannot directly determine impact or likelihood, it misses some of the 
pieces of the risk equation. This is to be expected, though. The authors of the framework 
emphasize the need for privacy expertise when using this framework. It does not claim that 
the privacy framework is the only thing an organization needs to ensure privacy, but they 
should still emphasize the existence of these restraints when applying the framework. 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Digital privacy research in the federal government, and specifically the DOD, is 
particularly important because unauthorized disclosure of privacy-sensitive data presents 
risks to accomplishing the enterprise’s mission. Federal government civilian employee, 
military member, and defense contractor data is not explicitly tied to commercial endeavors 
as may be the case in the private sector. In the case of the federal government, this data 
takes on a different value when that data is tied to national security, force protection, and 
ongoing or future DOD operations.  
The DON Contact Tracing System, which is being developed to curb the spread of 
COVID-19 and analyze social distancing measures, has the potential to collect private data 
on members of the DON workforce that adversaries could use to exploit and disrupt 
military operations and decision making [7]. Contact tracing data at a minimum includes 
time and proximity measurements between individuals, and this could lead to the 
reconstruction of organizational charts of a command or to the development of patterns of 
life of employees—both of which are serious OPSEC concerns. This information can also 
translate to adversaries making determinations about fleet readiness and future operations. 
Beyond the larger OPSEC concerns, leakage of privacy data can lead to coercion attacks 
against employees by those that wish to do harm to those individuals and exploit those 
them for the purposes of espionage and sabotage. As a bottom line, we observe that the 
privacy of DON personnel data must be considered a force protection issue with first-order 
implications for the design and operation of DON systems, not merely a legal hurdle to be 
cleared in a compliance-oriented manner. 
Any system that collects private data is inherently vulnerable to data leaks. In 
practice, there is no such thing as perfect privacy in the same way there is no such thing as 
perfect security. If user privacy is jeopardized by the contact tracing system, then why 
implement a contact tracing system at all? The answer to that involves analyzing a utility 
versus privacy tradeoff. The contact tracing system is a solution toward stopping the spread 
of a disease, but does the privacy cost outweigh the utility of the contact tracing system 
[28]? Using a risk-management framework, one can perform a risk assessment of this 
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tension and other risk-related tradeoffs. This thesis contributes to conducting privacy risk 
assessments of this type. 
Coincidentally, the outbreak of COVID-19 occurred about the same time as the 
release of the NIST Privacy Framework. The framework is meant to be used for conducting 
privacy risk assessments by facilitating a dialogue among stakeholders at all organizational 
levels about how to approach privacy when designing and implementing systems and 
applications [1]. The NIST Privacy Framework can contribute to the utility-versus-privacy 
calculation by providing the DON with a means to identify privacy risks in the contact 
tracing system. 
To test this claim, we constructed a privacy-threat model of the contact tracing 
system. The model highlights the threats along the data flow of user data from collection 
by wearable devices to ingestion into Jupiter, the DON’s enterprise data management 
system. The Jupiter system produces high-level decision-making products to leadership. 
After threat modeling, we applied the NIST Privacy Framework to the contact tracing 
system and focused on how the framework can be tailored toward identifying and 
addressing the same threats that we identified in the privacy threat model. This gave us a 
grasp on the extent to which the NIST Privacy Framework can be used in making risk 
assessments about privacy. 
Following the application of the NIST Privacy Framework to the DON Contact 
Tracing System, we can divide our results into the following two categories: an assessment 
of and recommendations for the contact tracing system in terms of a privacy risk profile, 
and an assessment and recommendations for applying and improving the NIST Privacy 
Framework within DON. 
One of our recommendations for engineers and developers involved in setting 
requirements for, implementing, and testing the DON contact tracing system or a similar 
system is that they be attentive to the intersection of policy, disassociation techniques, and 
security controls. All three areas need to be incorporated into the design of the system. 
Controls stem from policy, and if the privacy policy does not appropriately incorporate an 
organizational risk assessment, then the controls may not be effective. 
83 
The policy needs to be detailed at a technical level—not just in regard to legal 
compliance. One of the main results of threat modeling and applying the privacy 
framework is that more detail and consideration should be paid toward disassociation 
technologies and the policies governing them. In Chapter V, we reference the standards 
implemented by the GDRP and HIPAA concerning disassociation of private data. Specific 
technical requirements must flow down from these standards based on the risk tolerance of 
the DON for this specific application. Our research shows that the DON needs to look 
deeper into disassociation technologies. In addition, the DON needs to institute policies 
establishing its risk tolerance regarding de-identifying user data. We also recommend that 
the DON be wary of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products for which the vendors 
make guarantees of privacy based on simplicity measures such as removing names from 
data sets. Disassociation of user data involves a much more technical and thorough risk-
based approach. 
We recommend that the DON Contact Tracing System adopt HIPAA’s Expert 
Determination method, or something similar, to de-identify data [53]. We also recommend 
that the contact tracing data be collected and initially stored by BUMED personnel to 
ensure the chain of custody for PHI resides under a covered entity with an established 
standard for disassociation of user data. BUMED can then apply its de-identification 
standard before releasing data sets to Jupiter for use by the larger naval enterprise. 
Streamlining the data path through BUMED corresponds to applying the well-established 
principle of least privilege and supports privacy protection through robust data security. 
We describe in this thesis how security is required for privacy, but it is not all that 
is required. Ensuring encryption of and controlled access to data supports confidentiality, 
but it is not sufficient for ensuring privacy. We make it clear that re-identifying users based 
on their collected data may have nothing to do with security if analysts have obtained the 
data sets through authorized channels. This is why we recommend that in addition to 
security testing by organizations like NSWC Crane, the DON should also develop a similar 
privacy testing program that includes privacy testing when assessing federal information 
systems. This would involve actions like applying a framework like the NIST Privacy 
Framework or assessing the likelihood of machine learning algorithms being able to re-
identify datasets based on the addition or removal of quasi-identifiers. 
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Finally, we make an assessment of the NIST Privacy Framework and provide 
recommendations for improving it or applying it in the future. It became clear after 
applying the NIST Privacy Framework that the framework is primarily a guide for 
identifying privacy threats, and it should be used as such. As a guide for risk identification, 
the framework only addresses part of risk-management equation. The other important 
factors in risk management include assessed impact, assessed likelihood of occurrence, and 
an organization’s risk tolerance [3]. The privacy framework is also intentionally vague and 
meant to be flexible. This leaves a lot of interpretation up to the organization applying it. 
This thesis asserts that the NIST Privacy Framework is not a complete solution for privacy-
risk assessment. 
The NIST Privacy Framework should not be used in a checklist manner for 
identifying threats and implementing controls. Doing so could be troublesome when 
determining compliance because the line items of the framework are not parameterized in 
a manner that readily supports binary decision-making on privacy. For this reason, we do 
not recommend that the NIST Privacy Framework be made mandatory as a compliance 
checker because privacy assurance involves levels of risk. 
We recommend that NIST combine its cybersecurity and privacy frameworks into 
a single framework. Privacy and cybersecurity are separate but related concepts. Many of 
the control families overlap the two concepts. Combining the two frameworks would not 
only streamline the assessment process, but it would also better align with current standard 
publications that provide both privacy and security controls (i.e., NIST SP 800-53 rev5). 
Federal employees are already required to integrate the cybersecurity framework when 
assessing information systems, and it is likely only a matter of time before the referencing 
the privacy framework becomes a requirement. 
The privacy and cybersecurity frameworks are similar in structure and remain 
insufficiently distinguishable from each other in several aspects. This work makes the 
argument that the privacy framework does not add enough value to privacy risk 
assessments to require it to be a separate guide. A single framework would be able to 
consolidate controls and mechanisms that apply to both security and privacy, but at the 
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same time, it would also be able to isolate and identify privacy-specific controls for use in 
a privacy risk assessment. 
The NIST Privacy Framework is still a useful guide for privacy risk assessment in 
terms of identifying risk and identifying possible controls to those risks, but NIST needs to 
further the investigation of what mechanisms are needed for making determinations about 
the impact and likelihood of threats occurring. Additionally, the vagueness of the 
framework requires additional effort on the part of practitioners applying the framework in 
order to mold the framework around their intended privacy goals. 
As for the DON Contact Tracing System, the privacy risk assessment depends on 
the risk tolerance of the DON at any point in time. Fortunately for the DON, guidance like 
that provided in the NIST Privacy Framework can assist in assessing privacy risk. The 
DON needs to ensure that it is also doing its due diligence to define its risk tolerance and 
adjust its technical and policy controls as laid out in this thesis’s recommendations. 
A. FUTURE WORK 
The following sections present potential areas of research that would advance our 
understanding of privacy from two perspectives: technical mechanisms and policy 
mandates (including law). The first two areas of future work involve modeling and 
applying machine learning techniques to data sets that contain PII which might involve 
applications of differential privacy. The second two areas focus on investigating privacy 
governance surrounding the Jupiter system and how recently released privacy frameworks 
compare to each other. 
1. Real-World Testing 
Future work should focus first on testing the contact tracing system in a real-world 
application. The DON planned on using the USNA as a test bed for the technology, but 
just because the United States appears to be moving past COVID-19, one should not wait 
to continue this research until the next pandemic occurs. Testing the DON contact tracing 
system now will provide insight for its improvement and how to conduct privacy 
assessment of other similar Bluetooth systems for use in tracking personnel in the fleet. 
For example, a Naval vessel might want to use Bluetooth beacons for access control 
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(similar to RFID tags) or for monitoring foot traffic in certain spaces onboard a ship. The 
testing procedures would be similar for such scenarios, and the goal would be to measure 
how much private data is leaked about users’ movements and what that leaked information 
could be used for (e.g., creation of high-fidelity social network graphs). 
Ideally, the test would require DON employees and servicemembers of varying 
rank to wear Bluetooth tokens. The tester would need access to the identified and 
deidentified contact tracing data, and the tester could then apply for instance supervised 
machine learning techniques to the data in order to determine the difficultly of extracting 
private data for the wearers. The tester would test to determine the extent to which they can 
recover an organizational chart for the command or infer personal schedules that can lead 
to reidentifying those wearers; what we describe here is red-teaming for privacy. There is 
also the option of using synthetic data to test the privacy leakage of a Bluetooth Contact 
tracing system, but ground truth data would have to be constructed in order to use 
supervised machine learning techniques. 
The starting point for this testing would be replicating existing analyses of risks to 
individual-level identification such as those in Eagle and Pentland or de Montjoye et al. 
[38], [45]. Similar techniques could be used or modified for evaluating the risk of 
individual-level inferences from data generated by a wearable contact tracing system. 
2. Disassociation Technologies 
In NIST’s “Roadmap for Advancing the NIST Privacy Framework: A Tool for 
Improving Privacy through Enterprise Risk Management,” NIST zeros in on several 
evolving areas of ongoing research with one of these being “De-identification Techniques 
and Re-identification Risks” [22]. This thesis also counts disassociation as a primary 
concern in the DON Contact Tracing System, especially after the contact tracing data has 
been transferred to BUMED and Jupiter. Further research is required to determine the 
effect that adding or removing quasi-identifiers to contact tracing data will have toward re-
identification. 
If the contact tracing data is available for testing, the best starting point would be 
to look at the works of de Montjoye, especially his work “Unique in the Crowd: The 
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privacy bounds of human mobility” [45]. In his works, he experiments with identifying 
unique patterns from user data from items such as mobile phones and credit cards. Future 
researchers could apply some of the techniques from his works to contact tracing data sets 
to determine the likelihood of re-identification. Quasi identifiers could also be added to the 
feature space in order to study how they improve that likelihood. 
3. Jupiter System 
This thesis presents a very high-level description of the Jupiter system, but further 
investigation is still needed into the intricacies and details of Jupiter and whether any 
undiscovered privacy or data governance issues are lingering beneath the surface. Jupiter 
is the consolidation of many subsystems and databases, and the relationships between these 
entities could reveal problem areas for privacy and data governance [12]. Of course, the 
designers of the system have sought approval for ATO through the appropriate channels, 
but there is room for further investigation of the data flow of data collected in the future as 
the ATO process does not explicitly consider privacy risk, which may evolve as the data 
within the system changes. This could reveal the details surrounding privacy implications 
in the technical, policy, and legal domains. A good starting point in this research would be 
to refer to the Kroll et al. paper about data governance [56]. 
An in-depth view of the privacy risk surrounding the use of Jupiter would entail 
work with the DON CIO Privacy Office. Some questions that could be answered are 
whether documentation that is more invasive and comprehensive than a PIA should be 
required for a system of this scope. The research presented in this thesis presents an 
argument that PIAs do not provide the most comprehensive risk assessment of a federal 
system. A combination of a privacy framework like the NIST Privacy Framework and a 
designated official or office that works directly for DON CIO that solely manages privacy 
aspects of this system may better serve privacy needs for this system. That would require 
a review of how DON CIO performs it privacy and cybersecurity functions regarding 
Jupiter. 
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4. The NIST Frameworks and the ISO/IEC 27701 Privacy Extension 
The final area of future research would be to identify other federal systems 
dissimilar to the contact tracing system and applying the NIST Privacy Framework. The 
results of this research would also be focused on assessing the privacy framework itself 
and determine whether any further conclusions can be made about the effectiveness of the 
framework on other systems. This would provide evidence as to whether the framework 
can be applied to a wide spectrum of systems, and if this is not the case, what prevents its 
general applicability. 
Furthermore, it would beneficial to compare the NIST Privacy Framework to the 
ISO/IEC 27701:2019 (the privacy extension to the ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002) 
since both of these frameworks came out with a year of each other [57]. ISO appears to 
have made their privacy framework an extension of their security framework, whereas 
NIST released a privacy framework that is on the same level as its Cybersecurity 
framework. This thesis makes the recommendation of combining the NIST cybersecurity 
and privacy frameworks, and a comparison of the NIST frameworks and the ISO 
frameworks may provide some insight into whether it makes more sense to combine 
frameworks or keep them separate.  
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APPENDIX A. CONTACT TRACING SYSTEMS IN 
DEVELOPMENT AND USE 
B. PAN-EUROPEAN PRIVACY PRESERVING PROXIMITY TRACING 
(PEPP-PT) 
PEPP-PT is an organization incorporated in Switzerland that was created as a non-
profit in March 2020 by a multi-national European team of scientists and technologists. 
The organization’s goal is to facilitate the development of a digital pandemic management 
approach via a privacy-preserving, proximity-based contact tracing system [58]. PEPP-
PT’s main role is to provide standards, mechanisms, and services to countries and 
developers while fostering international cooperation, promoting knowledge sharing 
between organizations, and promoting the adoption of their proximity tracing systems [59]. 
PEPP-PT intends to aid the development of a proximity tracing system that is fully 
compliant with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and therefore 
interoperable when traveling between European countries [58], [60]. 
In addition to international interoperability, all the implementations of PEPP-PT 
must integrate with smartphone technology and local IT infrastructure. PEPP-PT requires 
the use of smartphone applications for contact tracing because it is a ubiquitous digital 
technology that can be retrofitted as a measuring device using Bluetooth-based proximity 
measurements and can communicate to users that are at risk of infection [59], [60]. 
This international initiative is the umbrella organization for several proximity 
tracing implementations that follow the interoperability standards and requirements set 
forth by PEPP-PT. These standards and requirements range from being secure and privacy-
preserving to being approved by national health authorities all while being able to be 
dismantled when no longer needed [60]. 
The systems currently under the PEPP-PT project are detailed below and include 
DP-3T, NTK, and ROBERT. They all use Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) for proximity 
measurements, but they differ primarily in terms of their centralized or decentralized 
approach to proximity tracing. 
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1. Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) 
DP-3T is a proximity tracing system that uses “a smartphone app that continuously 
broadcasts an ephemeral, pseudo-random ID representing the user’s phone and also records 
the pseudo-random identifiers observed from smartphones in close proximity” [58]. If a 
user is diagnosed with COVID-19, the user can upload to a backend server all the pseudo-
random identifiers that were previously broadcast from their phone over a predesignated 
time interval. The backend server will then distribute anonymous exposure information to 
other users that they can cross reference with the pseudo-random identifiers that they 
collected over the same predesignated time interval. If the user checking this exposure 
information finds a match between a pseudo-random identifier of an infected user and a 
pseudo-random identifier that they have collected previously and stored in their 
smartphone, the potentially affected user can take the proper precautions by seeking 
medical attention for testing and potentially quarantining themselves [61]. 
Users uploading their representations of their ephemeral identifiers to the backend 
server upon diagnosis is voluntary, and users have to continuously query the backend 
server for updated exposure information [61]. 
The most important feature of this system is that it is decentralized, meaning the 
backend server does not perform any processing, and it only acts as a communication 
platform between users. A compromise of this server would not affect the privacy of users 
providing or receiving information to or from this backend server [61]. 
DP-3T proposes three different implementations that include low-cost 
decentralized proximity tracing, unlikable decentralized proximity tracing, and hybrid 
decentralized proximity tracing. For each implementation, the ephemeral identifiers are 
generated cryptographically using a random seed linked to a time value (day, epoch, time 
window) within each user’s smartphone. Once generated, these ephemeral identifiers are 
broadcast to other smartphones, and the receiving smartphones store a version of the 
ephemeral identifier collected, the exposure measurement, and the day or time window 
when the ephemeral identifier was received [61]. 
If a user is diagnosed with COVID-19, the user can upload to the backend server 
the random seed used to generate the ephemeral IDs as well as the time value linked to that 
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seed. This is the information the backend server broadcasts to the other users, and the other 
users use these two pieces of information to regenerate the ephemeral identifiers and 
calculate the risk of infection by comparing them with the stored ephemeral identifiers on 
their smartphones [61]. 
The three implementation designs mainly differ in regard to bandwidth and storage 
requirements, but each design has built-in mechanisms to protect privacy. All 
implementations allow the user to upload a representation of the ephemeral identifiers 
(random seeds and linked time value) to the backend server rather than the raw ephemeral 
identifiers. The random seed used to generate ephemeral IDs will also change at 
predetermined time intervals, including when the seed is uploaded to the backend server, 
which makes it more difficult for a network observer to identify users based on ephemeral 
identifiers. Some of the implementations also broadcast dummy traffic to the backend 
server to further deter and mislead network observers [61]. 
While DP-3T claims to be privacy preserving, some aspects of the system have 
been identified as inherently bad for privacy. In addition to a slew of attacks by an 
adversary that include false alerts, false reports, replay attacks, and relay attacks; DP-3T 
provides a new vector to track people using the smartphone app. Vaudenay claims that 
Bluetooth broadcasting, at the very least, will reveal the presence of a smartphone using 
the DP-3T app [29]. Some of the more extreme threats to privacy could include 
deanonymizing users as well as adversaries coercing users to give up their personal data 
which is all stored on their smartphones in accordance with the DP-3T system. The DP-3T 
system does collect a minimal amount of information from users, but this information can 
reveal a lot if analyzed by an adversary [29]. 
2. NTK and ROBERT 
PEPP-PT NTK and PEPP-PT ROBERT are similar systems, implemented in 
Germany and France respectively, and they differ from the DP-3T mainly by being 
characterized as centralized systems [62]. This means that infected users send received 
ephemeral identifiers to a central server rather that user’s own broadcasted ephemeral 
identifiers. The central server then performs all the risk calculations rather than those 
calculations being performed locally on the user’s smartphone. The central server will use 
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these calculations to determine which users are at risk and then notify those users via the 
smartphone app [63]–[65]. 
The creation of ephemeral identifiers occurs in a similar manner as with DP-3T, 
but with NTK/ROBERT, the ephemeral identifiers are derived at the backend server and 
sent to users. This allows the NTK/ROBERT server to keep a copy of all the recent 
ephemeral identifiers created, and they can be used for risk calculations as infected users 
report received ephemeral identifiers to the backend server [63], [64]. 
Since the backend server derives all the ephemeral identifiers from a permeant 
identifier that users will register with the system, the backend server can decrypt any 
ephemeral identifier back to that permanent identifier. This is one of the primary privacy 
concerns with NTK/ROBERT and centralized systems in general. There is always the fear 
that this kind of system can be used for mass surveillance of citizens as it would not be too 
difficult to deanonymize a user by linking their permanent identifier to other identifiers 
external to the system [63], [64]. 
This centralized system also creates an environment where the backend server can 
construct a social graph of users using proximity values and timestamps received by users. 
The more people that report infection to the backend server, the better the backend server 
is able to expand on and fine tune the social graph of users. This means that users not at 
risk could have a portion of their social graphs exposed by the contact submissions of others 
[63], [64]. 
C. PRIVATE AUTOMATED CONTACT TRACING (PACT) 
PACT, much like PEPP-PT, is a collaboration among several universities, private 
research centers, and development centers that are working toward designing an exposure 
detection system using personal digital communication devices. The collaboration is led 
by MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL), MIT Internet 
Policy Research Initiative, Massachusetts General Hospital Center for Global Health, and 
MIT Lincoln Laboratory [66]. PACT is similar to the DP-3T system in many regards; the 
most prominent similarity is that they both use a Bluetooth Low Energy, decentralized 
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approach for proximity tracing, and both organizations agree that privacy is a paramount 
concern in the development process [66], [67]. 
PACT enabled devices broadcast “chirps” that are created in the same manner as 
ephemeral identifiers in the DP-3T system; the only slight difference is that PACT is 
modeling its proposal on Apple’s Find My protocol [67]. Whether this was intentional, this 
will allow PACT to more easily integrate with Apple devices when the application is 
implemented. 
It is important to note that with this system, the user is given autonomy over the life 
cycle of the system. In addition to the user being able to make the choice whether or not to 
use the system, all risk calculations are determined on the user’s device, and the user 
controls the process of uploading their broadcasted “chirp” information to the exposure 
database. Furthermore, the user also has the option of uploading only a portion of their data 
to the database or delay the upload of their data if they so choose [67]. 
As stated earlier, privacy controls are baked into the system. PACT claims it 
“provides the highest amount of privacy possible for an automated contact tracing system, 
even against a technologically sophisticated attacker with the ability to eavesdrop on all 
nearby BLE transmissions and write custom software that interacts with all devices in close 
proximity” [67]. Nevertheless, PACT does acknowledge that privacy in the system is not 
absolute, and that there are privacy flaws inherent to any automated contact tracing system. 
This is why the PACT collaboration emphasizes that users are still expected to consider 
the tradeoffs between social health and civil liberties [67]. 
D. APPLE / GOOGLE 
One of the lines of efforts of the PACT collaboration described above is to assess 
the exposure notification software developed and distributed by Apple and Google since 
Apple and Google announced a joint effort in April 2020 to develop a system using 
Bluetooth on their mobile devices to reduce the spread of COVID-19 [66], [68]. The Apple 
and Google system is designed to be rolled out in two phases. In the first phases that started 
in May 2020, Apple and Google allowed contact tracing apps developed by public health 
authorities to work across their devices using APIs that Apple and Google made available. 
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In the second phase, Apple and Google are updating the operating systems of their devices 
to send out and listen for Bluetooth beacons without requiring the app to be installed. If a 
user is diagnosed to be at risk, they will be prompted to download an official app [68]. 
The Apple and Google system resembles the DP-3T system in many ways. The 
system is decentralized; therefore, all risk calculations take place on the user’s device. The 
ephemeral identifiers are generated in a similar manner to DP-3T where Apple and Google 
use rolling identifiers to prevent linking and wireless tracking. When a user is diagnosed 
as positive for COVID-19, they have the choice to upload their rolling identifiers that they 
broadcast during a specified time interval [69].  
In addition to the rolling identifiers to help prevent tracking, Apple and Google 
have built in other privacy enhancing features that have also been present in PACT and 
PEPP-PT requirements. Apple and Google stress the autonomy of the users in being able 
to decide whether they want to use the app, whether they want to share data, and 
additionally they can also control which data they want to share [68]. Apple and Google 
further stress that the technology will only share data with public health authorities. In 
congruence with PACT and PEPP-PT requirements, Apple and Google have also 
acknowledged that they will be able to disable exposure notifications when this 
technology’s functionality is no longer needed [68]. 
E. TRACETOGETHER 
TraceTogether is a contact tracing system developed by Singapore’s Government 
Technology Agency and Ministry of Health, and it is considered the first national 
deployment of a Bluetooth-based contact tracing system in the world [33]. This system is 
the most similar to PEPP-PT NTK/ROBERT since it uses a centralized system to generate 
temporary identifiers and calculate risk assessments. A central server contains the secret 
key to encrypt and decrypt temporary identifiers; therefore, infected users must upload 
their encounter history (temporary identifiers received) to the central server in order for the 
health authorities in Singapore to calculate a risk assessment [33]. 
While TraceTogether appears to be implemented as a centralized system in 
Singapore, BlueTrace, the privacy preserving protocol that TraceTogether uses, claims that 
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the system is actually a hybrid model of contact tracing. This is based on encounter 
messages being stored in a decentralized peer-to-peer fashion between users. Only when 
someone is diagnosed with COVID-19 does the user need to interact with a central server 
[33]. This is a somewhat clever distinction made by BlueTrace, but it does not stop others 
from classifying it as a centralized system along with ROBERT and NTK [30]. BlueTrace 
also claims that TraceTogether could be implemented as a completely decentralized 
system, but they do not recommend using decentralized systems for contact tracing, citing 
it as an easy way to abuse the system by users self-reporting false alerts [33]. 
Much like the other systems previously discussed, TraceTogether considers privacy 
a priority which it manifests in aspects like rotating temporary identifiers to prevent 
tracking users, storing encounter histories locally on user devices, and giving user control 
over having their data stored with the health authority. The most concerning privacy aspect 
of the TraceTogether system is that users must register their phone number with the health 
authority in order to use the app. This gives the health authority (central server) a piece of 
personally identifiable information to link to the users. Because of this, TraceTogether 
cannot avoid the same concerns as other centralized systems like ROBERT/NTK where a 
high level of trust must be placed on the government and health entities that have access to 
that central server [33], [37], [70]. Singapore prefers this centralized system specifically 
due to the fact that it allows health authorities to reconstruct more of a social graph when 
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APPENDIX B. NIST PRIVACY FRAMEWORK APPLICATION 
The goal of this Appendix is to operationalize the NIST Privacy Framework in the 
context of the DON Contact Tracing System. In other words, does the NIST Privacy 
Framework lead the DON to a point where it can accomplish its goals while preserving 
privacy in the process? Can the NIST Privacy Framework mappings to the NIST SP 800-53 
rev5 controls sufficiently address the privacy concerns discussed in Chapter III? Is the 
NIST Privacy Framework able to accomplish what it actually claims when applied to this 
contact tracing system? 
The above questions lay the groundwork for applying the NIST Privacy Framework 
to the contact tracing system in this chapter. This involves discussing the how the Core 
functions are mapped to the NIST SP 800-53 rev5, reiterating the goals of the contact 
tracing system, and providing criteria for control selection in this particular application. 
Controls are then chosen from each Core function if they are applicable to the goals and/or 
privacy concerns of the contact tracing system. 
For this research, the NIST Privacy Framework is being applied after conducting 
the privacy threat model in Chapter IV. The threat model is meant to provide a foundation 
of the system and its privacy threats in order to streamline the application of the NIST 
Privacy Framework. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
The following section details control selection for the DON Contact Tracing 
System. This involves identifying a pool of controls that deal with security and privacy 
(NIST SP 800-53 rev5 in this case), evaluating the goals of the system, and the choosing 
criteria on which to base control selection. 
1. Core and Mappings to NIST SP 800-53 rev5 
Along with the release of the NIST Privacy Framework, NIST has also provided on 
its website an Excel spreadsheet that maps the Privacy Framework’s Core Functions, 
Categories, and Subcategories to NIST SP 800-53 rev5 controls [71]. NIST makes the 
claim that “Organizations should not assume there is a one-to-one relationship between the 
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SP 800–53 controls and the Subcategories” [71]. While this makes sense since every 
system is unique and may require a different approach to achieving privacy goals, at some 
level these organizations need to apply controls to achieve its goals. If NIST is going to 
provide a mapping to controls, these controls should be evaluated along with the 
framework itself since these control recommendations may have implications for the 
overall effectiveness of the framework.  
Since NIST has established NIST SP 800-53 rev5 controls as the most relevant 
baseline controls that map to the Privacy Framework, this annex will use the controls 
provided in the mapping to perform the assessment of the contact tracing system. 
The first step in applying the NIST Privacy Framework is identifying Core 
Functions, Categories, and Subcategories that an organization wants to prioritize to help it 
manage privacy risk. This allows an organization to build a profile of its risk management 
needs which can then be evaluated via implementation tiers. The scope of this assessment 
will involve only choosing the Core Functions, Categories, Subcategories, and NIST SP 
800-53 rev5 controls that are applicable to the contact tracing system. This essentially 
constructs a profile of the system, and it should also recommend controls for mitigating 
privacy concerns within that profile. 
 
 
Figure 16. NIST Privacy Framework Organization. 
2. Criteria for Control Selection 
The Core Functions map to 228 different controls in NIST SP 800-53 rev5. It would 
be exhaustive to apply every control to the DON Contact Tracing System in this annex; 
therefore, this annex applies criteria for the selection of controls to evaluate the system 
against. These criteria are meant to include controls that apply specifically to the DON 
Contact tracing system and its somewhat unique privacy concerns. Controls that can be 
applied broadly to most systems being evaluated will be avoided in this assessment. 
Function Category Subcategory Control(s) 
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These broad categories of controls that will be omitted include controls that may 
focus on testing, auditing, maintenance, resilience, and supply chain. While these 
categories of control are important to the assessment of the contact tracing system, they 
represent categories of privacy/security controls that should be applied to any system 
procured or developed by the DON regardless of function or purpose. This mainly limits 
the control selection to technical privacy-specific controls as well as policy and procedure 
controls since privacy is very dependent on policy measures in a contact tracing system of 
this size. 
3. Goals of the System and Privacy Concerns (Consolidated from Chapter 
III) 
It is important to reiterate and/or consolidate the goals of the DON Contact Tracing 
system (shown in Table 6) in order to better understand the rationale behind which Core 
Functions, Categories, Subcategories, and controls are used. The goals of the system along 
with specific privacy concerns of the system will determine how controls are chosen. 
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Table 6. Goals of the Contact Tracing System and Privacy Concerns 
Goals of the Contact Tracing System 
The DON Contact Tracing System shall mitigate the spread of COVID-19 and measure 
the effectiveness of social distancing measures at Naval commands.  
The system shall also protect user privacy in accordance with applicable laws, policies, 
and regulations.  
The system shall protect Personally Identifiable Information that could lead to 
operational security infractions or data being leaked about mission readiness of a 
command.  
Policy Concerns: Data governance between multiple organizations 
Access control policies 
Minimization of data 
Technical Concerns: Wearable Device 
Collection 
Centralized versus Decentralized 
Bluetooth versus GPS 
Automated versus Human in the 
loop 
Wearable versus Phone App 
Distributed Architecture Cloud Architecture 
Priority of Data 
De-identification 
 
The NIST Privacy Framework needs to at least address the above concerns over 
privacy in order for the DON Contact Tracing System to fulfill its goals. 
4. Claims of the Framework 
The other consideration to this assessment of the DON Contact Tracing System is 
having a realistic expectation of what the NIST Privacy Framework is able to provide in 
ensuring privacy in a system. NIST claims that the Privacy Framework’s purpose is to 
“manage privacy risk” [1]. This includes assisting organizations with privacy risk 
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assessments, creating privacy mappings to informative references, strengthening 
accountability with stakeholders, applying privacy to the System Development Life Cycle 
(SDLC), establishing or improving privacy programs, assessing the data processing 
ecosystem, and informing buying decisions [1]. 
The DON’s goals broadly align with these stated purposes of the framework; 
however, those claims of the framework are meant to be very broad and vague so that the 
framework can remain flexible to any technology, sector, law, or jurisdiction. If the NIST 
Privacy Framework is unable to provide the results or granularity that the DON is 
expecting, the DON should consider whether or not the NIST Privacy Framework is an 
acceptable framework for this task (see Chapter VI for more details on framework 
applicability). 
B. RESULTS TABLE 
The following table shows the chosen NIST SP 800-53 rev5 controls that were 
chosen based on the needs of the contact tracing system. These controls can and should be 
combined with other common security/privacy controls when designing the system in order 
to increase the privacy of the system. Based on the way the NIST Privacy Framework was 
designed, this would constitute the first step of applying the framework by choosing Core 
Functions, Categories, and Subcategories that are prioritized by the organization. The table 
below would represent a version of a Profile that the DON is trying to establish in order to 
assess privacy and make risk decisions when continuing to design and implement the 
system. 
Table 7 (shown below) was taken directly from the NIST SP 800-53 rev5 mapping 
spreadsheet provided by NIST [71]. The only modifications to the original spreadsheet 
occur in the “NIST SP 800-53, Revision 5, Control” column. For this thesis, this column 
is separated into two columns that show the control identifier in NIST SP 800-53 rev5 and 
the associated control name for ease of reading. NIST SP 800-53 rev5 controls that were 
not applicable to the contact tracing system are omitted from the spreadsheet. 
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Table 7. NIST Privacy Framework and Chosen SP 800–53 Controls. Adapted from [1], [6], [71]. 
NIST Privacy Framework Core NIST SP 800-53, Revision 5, Control 
Function Category Subcategory Control ID Control Name 
  
IDENTIFY-P (ID-P): Develop 
the organizational 
understanding to manage 
privacy risk for individuals 
arising from data processing. 
Inventory and Mapping 
(ID.IM-P): Data processing 
by systems, products, or 
services is understood and 
informs the management 
of privacy risk. 
ID.IM-P1: Systems/products/services 
that process data are inventoried. 
CM-12 Information Location 
CM-13 Data Action Mapping 
ID.IM-P2: Owners or operators (e.g., 
the organization or third parties such 
as service providers, partners, 
customers, and developers) and their 
roles with respect to the 
systems/products/services and 
components (e.g., internal or 
external) that process data are 
inventoried. 
CM-13 Data Action Mapping 
ID.IM-P3: Categories of individuals 
(e.g., customers, employees or 
prospective employees, consumers) 
whose data are being processed are 
inventoried. 
CM-13 Data Action Mapping 
ID.IM-P4: Data actions of the 
systems/products/services are 
inventoried. 
CM-13 Data Action Mapping 
ID.IM-P5: The purposes for the data 
actions are inventoried. 
CM-13 Data Action Mapping 
PT-2 Authority to Process PII 
ID.IM-P6: Data elements within the 
data actions are inventoried. CM-13 Data Action Mapping 
103 
NIST Privacy Framework Core NIST SP 800-53, Revision 5, Control 
Function Category Subcategory Control ID Control Name 
ID.IM-P7: The data processing 
environment is identified (e.g., 
geographic location, internal, cloud, 
third parties). 
CM-12 Information Location 
CM-13 Data Action Mapping 
ID.IM-P8: Data processing is mapped, 
illustrating the data actions and 
associated data elements for 
systems/products/services, including 
components; roles of the component 
owners/operators; and interactions of 
individuals or third parties with the 
systems/products/services. 





and activities are 
understood and 
prioritized; this 
information is used to 
inform privacy roles, 
responsibilities, and risk 
management decisions. 
ID.BE-P1: The organization’s role(s) in 
the data processing ecosystem are 
identified and communicated. 
 
ID.BE-P2: Priorities for organizational 
mission, objectives, and activities are 
established and communicated. 
PM-11 Mission Business Process Definition 
ID.BE-P3: Systems/products/services 
that support organizational priorities 
are identified and key requirements 
communicated. 
RA-9 Criticality Analysis 
Risk Assessment (ID.RA-
P): The organization 
ID.RA-P1: Contextual factors related 
to the systems/products/services and CM-13 Data Action Mapping 
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understands the privacy 
risks to individuals and 
how such privacy risks 
may create follow-on 
impacts on organizational 
operations, including 






the data actions are identified (e.g., 
individuals’ demographics and privacy 
interests or perceptions, data 
sensitivity and/or types, visibility of 
data processing to individuals and 
third parties).  
RA-3 Risk Assessment 
RA-8 Privacy Impact Assessment 
ID.RA-P2: Data analytic inputs and 
outputs are identified and evaluated 
for bias. 
 
ID.RA-P3: Potential problematic data 
actions and associated problems are 
identified.  
CM-13 Data Action Mapping 
RA-3 Risk Assessment 
RA-8 Privacy Impact Assessment 
ID.RA-P4: Problematic data actions, 
likelihoods, and impacts are used to 
determine and prioritize risk. 
RA-3 Risk Assessment 
RA-8 Privacy Impact Assessment 
ID.RA-P5: Risk responses are 
identified, prioritized, and 
implemented. 





priorities, constraints, risk 
tolerance, and 
assumptions are 
ID.DE-P1: Data processing ecosystem 
risk management policies, processes, 
and procedures are identified, 
established, assessed, managed, and 
agreed to by organizational 
stakeholders. 
SA-9 External System Services 
SR-4 Provenance 
PM-9 Risk Management Strategy 
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established and used to 
support risk decisions 
associated with managing 
privacy risk and third 
parties within the data 




processes to identify, 
assess, and manage 
privacy risks within the 
data processing 
ecosystem. 
ID.DE-P2: Data processing ecosystem 
parties (e.g., service providers, 
customers, partners, product 
manufacturers, application 
developers) are identified, prioritized, 
and assessed using a privacy risk 
assessment process. 
RA-3 Risk Assessment 
RA-8 Privacy Impact Assessment 
ID.DE-P3: Contracts with data 
processing ecosystem parties are 
used to implement appropriate 
measures designed to meet the 
objectives of an organization’s privacy 
program.  
SA-9 External System Services 
ID.DE-P4: Interoperability frameworks 
or similar multi-party approaches are 
used to manage data processing 
ecosystem privacy risks.  
 
ID.DE-P5: Data processing ecosystem 
parties are routinely assessed using 
audits, test results, or other forms of 
evaluations to confirm they are 
meeting their contractual, 
interoperability framework, or other 
obligations. 
SA-9 External System Services 
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GOVERN-P (GV-P): Develop 
and implement the 
organizational governance 
structure to enable an 
ongoing understanding of the 
organization’s risk 
management priorities that 




The policies, processes, 
and procedures to 
manage and monitor the 
organization’s regulatory, 
legal, risk, environmental, 
and operational 
requirements are 
understood and inform 
the management of 
privacy risk. 
GV.PO-P1: Organizational privacy 
values and policies (e.g., conditions on 
data processing such as data uses or 
retention periods, individuals’ 
prerogatives with respect to data 
processing) are established and 
communicated. 
all -1 
controls Policy and Procedures 
GV.PO-P2: Processes to instill 
organizational privacy values within 
system/product/service development 
and operations are established and in 
place. 
SA-3 System Development Life cycle 
GV.PO-P3: Roles and responsibilities 
for the workforce are established with 
respect to privacy.  
all -1 
controls Policy and Procedures 
PM-18 Privacy Program Plan 
PM-19 Privacy Program Leadership Role 
GV.PO-P4: Privacy roles and 
responsibilities are coordinated and 
aligned with third-party stakeholders 
(e.g., service providers, customers, 
partners). 
PM-18 Privacy Program Plan 
GV.PO-P5: Legal, regulatory, and 
contractual requirements regarding 
privacy are understood and managed. 
all -1 
controls Policy and Procedures 
 PM-3 Information Security and Privacy Resources 
PM-7 Enterprise Architecture 
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GV.PO-P6: Governance and risk 
management policies, processes, and 
procedures address privacy risks. 
PM-18 Privacy Program Plan 
PM-23 Data Governance Body 
PM-28 Risk Framing 
RA-3 Risk Assessment 
RA-8 Privacy Impact Assessments 
Risk Management 





established and used to 
support operational risk 
decisions. 
GV.RM-P1: Risk management 
processes are established, managed, 
and agreed to by organizational 
stakeholders. 
PM-9 Risk Management Strategy 
PM-28 Risk Framing 
GV.RM-P2: Organizational risk 
tolerance is determined and clearly 
expressed. 
PM-9 Risk Management Strategy 
GV.RM-P3: The organization’s 
determination of risk tolerance is 
informed by its role(s) in the data 
processing ecosystem. 
PM-28 Risk Framing 
Awareness and Training 
(GV.AT-P): The 
organization’s workforce 
and third parties engaged 
in data processing are 
provided privacy 
awareness education and 
are trained to perform 
their privacy-related 
GV.AT-P1: The workforce is informed 
and trained on its roles and 
responsibilities.  
 
GV.AT-P2: Senior executives 
understand their roles and 
responsibilities. 
 
GV.AT-P3: Privacy personnel 
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duties and responsibilities 






GV.AT-P4: Third parties (e.g., service 
providers, customers, partners) 
understand their roles and 
responsibilities. 
 
Monitoring and Review 
(GV.MT-P): The policies, 
processes, and procedures 
for ongoing review of the 
organization’s privacy 
posture are understood 
and inform the 
management of privacy 
risk. 
GV.MT-P1: Privacy risk is re-evaluated 
on an ongoing basis and as key 
factors, including the organization’s 
business environment (e.g., 
introduction of new technologies), 
governance (e.g., legal obligations, 
risk tolerance), data processing, and 
systems/products/services change. 
CM-4 Impact Analyses 
RA-3 Risk Assessment 
RA-8 Privacy Impact Assessment 
GV.MT-P2: Privacy values, policies, 
and training are reviewed and any 
updates are communicated.  
all -1 
controls Policy and Procedures 
GV.MT-P3: Policies, processes, and 
procedures for assessing compliance 
with legal requirements and privacy 
policies are established and in place. 
 
GV.MT-P4: Policies, processes, and 
procedures for communicating 
progress on managing privacy risks 
are established and in place. 
 
CM-4 Impact Analyses 
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GV.MT-P5: Policies, processes, and 
procedures are established and in 
place to receive, analyze, and respond 
to problematic data actions disclosed 
to the organization from internal and 
external sources (e.g., internal 
discovery, privacy researchers, 
professional events). 
RA-3 Risk Assessment 
RA-8 Privacy Impact Assessments 
SI-19(8) De-identification | Motivated Intruder 
GV.MT-P6: Policies, processes, and 
procedures incorporate lessons 
learned from problematic data 
actions. 
all -1 
controls Policy and Procedures 
GV.MT-P7: Policies, processes, and 
procedures for receiving, tracking, 
and responding to complaints, 
concerns, and questions from 
individuals about organizational 




 CONTROL-P (CT-P): Develop 
and implement appropriate 
activities to enable 
organizations or individuals to 
manage data with sufficient 
granularity to manage privacy 
risks. 
Data Processing Policies, 
Processes, and 
Procedures (CT.PO-P): 
Policies, processes, and 
procedures are 
maintained and used to 
manage data processing 
(e.g., purpose, scope, 
CT.PO-P1: Policies, processes, and 
procedures for authorizing data 
processing (e.g., organizational 
decisions, individual consent), 
revoking authorizations, and 
maintaining authorizations are 
established and in place. 
PT-1 Policy and Procedures 
PT-2 Authority to Process PII 
PT-3 PII Processing Purposes 
PT-4 Consent 
AC-1 Policy and Procedures 
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roles and responsibilities 




with the organization’s 
risk strategy to protect 
individuals’ privacy. 
CT.PO-P2: Policies, processes, and 
procedures for enabling data review, 
transfer, sharing or disclosure, 
alteration, and deletion are 
established and in place (e.g., to 
maintain data quality, manage data 
retention). 
AC-3(14) Access Enforcement | Individual Access 
CM-9 Configuration Management Plan 
CT.PO-P3: Policies, processes, and 
procedures for enabling individuals’ 
data processing preferences and 
requests are established and in place. 
AC-1 Policy and Procedures 
AC-3(14) Access Enforcement | Individual Access 
PT-1 Policy and Procedures 
PT-4 Consent 
CT.PO-P4: A data life cycle to manage 
data is aligned and implemented with 
the system development life cycle to 
manage systems. 
PL-8 Security and Privacy Architectures 
SA-3 System Development Life Cycle 
SA-8 Security and Privacy Engineering Principles 
SA-10 Developer Configuration Management 
SA-15 Development Process, Standards, and Tools 
SA-17 Developer Security and Privacy Architecture and Design 
Data Processing 
Management (CT.DM-P): 
Data are managed 
consistent with the 
organization’s risk 
strategy to protect 
individuals’ privacy, 
increase manageability, 
and enable the 
CT.DM-P1: Data elements can be 
accessed for review. 
AC-2 Account Management 
AC-3 Access Enforcement 
AC-3(14) Access Enforcement | Individual Access 
CT.DM-P2: Data elements can be 
accessed for transmission or 
disclosure. 
AC-2 Account Management 
AC-3 Access Enforcement 
AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement 
AC-21 Information Sharing 
CM-6 Configuration Settings 
AC-2 Account Management 
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implementation of privacy 
principles (e.g., individual 
participation, data quality, 
data minimization).  
CT.DM-P3: Data elements can be 
accessed for alteration. 
AC-3 Access Enforcement 
CM-6 Configuration Settings 
CT.DM-P4: Data elements can be 
accessed for deletion. 
AC-2 Account Management 
AC-3 Access Enforcement 
CM-6 Configuration Settings 
CT.DM-P5: Data are destroyed 
according to policy. SI-12(3) 
Information Management and Retention | 
Information Disposal 
 
CT.DM-P6: Data are transmitted using 
standardized formats. SI-10 Information Input Validation 
CT.DM-P7: Mechanisms for 
transmitting processing permissions 
and related data values with data 
elements are established and in place. 
AC-16 Security and Privacy Attributes 
PT-2(1) Authority to Process PII | Data Tagging 
PT-3(1) PII Processing Purposes | Data Tagging 
SC-7(24) Boundary Protection | PII 
SI-18(2) PII Quality Operations | Data Tags 
CT.DM-P8: Audit/log records are 
determined, documented, 
implemented, and reviewed in 
accordance with policy and 
incorporating the principle of data 
minimization. 
AU-1 Policy and Procedures 
AU-13 Monitoring for Information Disclosure 
AU-16 Cross-Organizational Audit Logging 
CT.DM-P9: Technical measures 
implemented to manage data 
processing are tested and assessed. 
CM-4(2) Impact Analyses | Verification of Controls 
SC-16(1) Transmission of Security and Privacy Attributes | Integrity Verification 
SI-19(8) De-identification | Motivated Intruder 
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CT.DM-P10: Stakeholder privacy 
preferences are included in 
algorithmic design objectives and 







consistent with the 
organization’s risk 
strategy to protect 
individuals’ privacy and 
enable implementation of 
privacy principles (e.g., 
data minimization). 
CT.DP-P1: Data are processed to limit 
observability and linkability (e.g., data 
actions take place on local devices, 
privacy-preserving cryptography). 
AC-23 Data Mining Protection 
AU-16(3) Cross-Organizational Audit Logging | Disassociability 
IA-8(6) Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) | Disassociability 
PL-8 Security and Privacy Architecture 
PM-7 Enterprise Architecture 
SA-8(33) Security and Engineering Privacy Principles | Minimization 
SA-17 Developer Security and Privacy Architecture and Design 
CT.DP-P2: Data are processed to limit 
the identification of individuals (e.g., 
de-identification privacy techniques, 
tokenization). 
AC-23 Data Mining Protection 
IA-4(8) Identifier Management | Pairwise Pseudonymous Identifiers 
SA-8(33) Security and Engineering Privacy Principles | Minimization 
SI-12(1) Information Management and Retention | Limit PII Elements 
SI-12(2) Information Management and Retention | Minimize PII in Testing, Training, and Research 
SI-19 De-Identification 
AC-23 Data Mining Protection 
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CT.DP-P3: Data are processed to limit 
the formulation of inferences about 
individuals’ behavior or activities (e.g., 
data processing is decentralized, 
distributed architectures). 
AU-16(3) Cross-Organizational Audit Logging | Disassociability 
IA-8(6) Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) | Disassociability 
PL-8 Security and Privacy Architectures 
PM-7 Enterprise Architecture 
SA-8(33) Security and Engineering Privacy Principles | Minimization 
SA-17 Developer Security and Privacy Architecture and Design 
SC-2(2) Separation of System and User Functionality | Disassociability 
SI-19 De-Identification 
CT.DP-P4: System or device 
configurations permit selective 
collection or disclosure of data 
elements.  
CM-6 Configuration Settings 
SA-8(33) Security and Engineering Privacy Principles | Minimization 
SC-42(5) Sensor Capability and Data | Collection Minimization 
CT.DP-P5: Attribute references are 
substituted for attribute values. 
AC-16 Security and Privacy Attributes 
SA-8(33) Security and Engineering Privacy Principles | Minimization 
  
COMMUNICATE-P (CM-P): 
Develop and implement 
appropriate activities to 
enable organizations and 
individuals to have a reliable 




Policies, processes, and 
procedures are 
maintained and used to 
CM.PO-P1: Transparency policies, 
processes, and procedures for 
communicating data processing 
purposes, practices, and associated 
privacy risks are established and in 
place. 
PT-1 Policy and Procedures 
PT-2 Authority to Process PII 
PT-3 PII Processing Purposes 
RA-8 Privacy Impact Assessment 
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a dialogue about how data 
are processed and associated 
privacy risks. 
increase transparency of 
the organization’s data 
processing practices (e.g., 
purpose, scope, roles and 




associated privacy risks. 
CM.PO-P2: Roles and responsibilities 
(e.g., public relations) for 
communicating data processing 
purposes, practices, and associated 





reliable knowledge about 
data processing practices 
and associated privacy 
risks, and effective 
mechanisms are used and 
maintained to increase 
predictability consistent 
with the organization’s 
risk strategy to protect 
individuals’ privacy.  
CM.AW-P1: Mechanisms (e.g., 
notices, internal or public reports) for 
communicating data processing 
purposes, practices, associated 
privacy risks, and options for enabling 
individuals’ data processing 
preferences and requests are 
established and in place. 
SC-42(4) Sensor Capability and Data | Notice of Collection 
CM.AW-P2: Mechanisms for 
obtaining feedback from individuals 
(e.g., surveys or focus groups) about 
data processing and associated 




design enables data processing 
visibility. 
PL-8 Security and Privacy Architectures 
SA-17 Developer Security and Privacy Architecture and Design 
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SC-42(4) Sensor Capability and Data | Notice of Collection 
CM.AW-P4: Records of data 
disclosures and sharing are 
maintained and can be accessed for 
review or transmission/disclosure. 
 
CM.AW-P5: Data corrections or 
deletions can be communicated to 
individuals or organizations (e.g., data 
sources) in the data processing 
ecosystem. 
SI-18(5) PII Quality Operations | Notice of Correction or Deletion 
CM.AW-P6: Data provenance and 
lineage are maintained and can be 
accessed for review or 
transmission/disclosure. 
AC-16 Security and Privacy Attributes 
SC-16 Transmission of Security and Privacy Attributes 
SR-4 Provenance 
CM.AW-P7: Impacted individuals and 
organizations are notified about a 
privacy breach or event. 
IR-1 Policy and Procedures 
CM.AW-P8: Individuals are provided 
with mitigation mechanisms (e.g., 
credit monitoring, consent 
withdrawal, data alteration or 
deletion) to address impacts of 
problematic data actions. 
 
  
PROTECT-P (PR-P): Develop 
and implement appropriate 
data processing safeguards. 
Data Protection Policies, 
Processes, and 
Procedures (PR.PO-P): 
PR.PO-P1: A baseline configuration of 
information technology is created and 
maintained incorporating security 
CM-1 Policy and Procedures 
CM-4 Impact Analyses 
CM-6 Configuration Settings 
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Security and privacy 
policies (e.g., purpose, 
scope, roles and 




and procedures are 
maintained and used to 
manage the protection of 
data. 
principles (e.g., concept of least 
functionality). 
CM-7 Least Functionality 
CM-9 Configuration Management Plan 
SA-10 Developer Configuration Management 
PR.PO-P2: Configuration change 
control processes are established and 
in place. 
CM-4 Impact Analyses 
SA-10 Developer Configuration Management 
PR.PO-P3: Backups of information are 
conducted, maintained, and tested. 
CP-6 Alternate Storage Site 
CP-9 System Backup 
PR.PO-P4: Policy and regulations 
regarding the physical operating 
environment for organizational assets 
are met. 
PE-1 Policy and Procedures 
PR.PO-P5: Protection processes are 
improved. PL-2 System Security and Privacy Plans 
PR.PO-P6: Effectiveness of protection 
technologies is shared. AC-21 Information Sharing 
PR.PO-P7: Response plans (Incident 
Response and Business Continuity) 
and recovery plans (Incident Recovery 
and Disaster Recovery) are 
established, in place, and managed. 
 
PR.PO-P8: Response and recovery 
plans are tested. 
 
PR.PO-P9: Privacy procedures are 
included in human resources practices 
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(e.g., deprovisioning, personnel 
screening). 
PR.PO-P10: A vulnerability 
management plan is developed and 
implemented. 
RA-1 Policy and Procedures 
RA-3 Risk Assessment 
RA-5 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning 
Identity Management, 
Authentication, and 
Access Control (PR.AC-P): 
Access to data and devices 
is limited to authorized 
individuals, processes, and 
devices, and is managed 
consistent with the 
assessed risk of 
unauthorized access. 
PR.AC-P1: Identities and credentials 
are issued, managed, verified, 
revoked, and audited for authorized 
individuals, processes, and devices. 
IA-1 Policy and Procedures 
IA-2 Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) 
IA-3 Device Identification and Authentication 
IA-4 Identifier Management 
IA-5 Authenticator Management 
IA-8 Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) 
IA-9 Service Identification and Authentication 
IA-12 Identity Proofing 
PR.AC-P2: Physical access to data and 
devices is managed. 
 
PR.AC-P3: Remote access is managed. AC-1 Policy and Procedures 
AC-20 Use of External Systems 
SC-15 Collaborative Computing Devices and Applications 
PR.AC-P4: Access permissions and 
authorizations are managed, 
incorporating the principles of least 
privilege and separation of duties. 
AC-1 Policy and Procedures 
AC-2 Account Management 
AC-3 Account Enforcement 
AC-5 Separation of Duties 
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AC-6 Least Privilege 
AC-14 Permitted Actions Without Identification and Authentication 
AC-16 Security and Privacy Attributes 
AC-24 Access Control Decision 
PR.AC-P5: Network integrity is 
protected (e.g., network segregation, 
network segmentation). 
AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement 
SC-7 Boundary Protection 
PR.AC-P6: Individuals and devices are 
proofed and bound to credentials, 
and authenticated commensurate 
with the risk of the transaction (e.g., 
individuals’ security and privacy risks 
and other organizational risks). 
AC-14 Security and Privacy Attributes 
AC-16 Access Control Decision 
IA-1 Policy and Procedures 
IA-2 Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) 
IA-3 Device Identification and Authentication 
IA-4 Identifier Management 
IA-5 Authenticator Management 
IA-8 Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) 
IA-9 Service Identification and Authentication 
IA-12 Identity Proofing 
Data Security (PR.DS-P): 
Data are managed 
consistent with the 
organization’s risk 
PR.DS-P1: Data-at-rest are protected. 
 
PR.DS-P2: Data-in-transit are 
protected. 
SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity 
SC-11 Trusted Path 
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strategy to protect 





and associated data are formally 
managed throughout removal, 
transfers, and disposition. 
 
PR.DS-P4: Adequate capacity to 
ensure availability is maintained. 
 
PR.DS-P5: Protections against data 
leaks are implemented. 
AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement 
AC-5 Separation of Duties 
AC-6 Least Privilege 
PE-19 Information Leakage 
SC-7 Boundary Protection 
SI-4 System Monitoring 
PR.DS-P6: Integrity checking 
mechanisms are used to verify 
software, firmware, and information 
integrity. 
 
PR.DS-P7: The development and 
testing environment(s) are separate 
from the production environment. 
 
PR.DS-P8: Integrity checking 




System maintenance and 
repairs are performed 
consistent with policies, 
PR.MA-P1: Maintenance and repair of 
organizational assets are performed 
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processes, and 
procedures. 
PR.MA-P2: Remote maintenance of 
organizational assets is approved, 
logged, and performed in a manner 




security solutions are 
managed to ensure the 
security and resilience of 
systems/products/services 
and associated data, 




PR.PT-P1: Removable media is 
protected and its use restricted 
according to policy. 
 
PR.PT-P2: The principle of least 
functionality is incorporated by 
configuring systems to provide only 
essential capabilities. 
CM-7 Least Functionality 
PR.PT-P3: Communications and 
control networks are protected. 
SC-7 Boundary Protection 
SC-11 Trusted Path 
SC-23 Session Authenticity 
SC-31 Cover Channel Analysis 
SC-38 Operations Security 
PR.PT-P4: Mechanisms (e.g., failsafe, 
load balancing, hot swap) are 
implemented to achieve resilience 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
[1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, “NIST Privacy Framework: A 
Tool for Improving Privacy Through Enterprise Risk Management, Version 1.0,” 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, NIST CSWP 
01162020, 2020. [Online]. doi: 10.6028/NIST.CSWP.01162020 
 
[2] D. K. Mulligan, C. Koopman, and N. Doty, “Privacy is an essentially contested 
concept: A multi-dimensional analytic for mapping privacy,” Phil. Trans. R. Soc. 
A., vol. 374, no. 2083, p. 20160118, Dec. 2016. [Online]. doi: 
10.1098/rsta.2016.0118 
 
[3] S. Brooks, M. Garcia, N. Lefkovitz, S. Lightman, and E. Nadeau, “An 
Introduction to Privacy Engineering and Risk Management in Federal Systems,” 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, NIST IR 
8062, 2017. [Online]. doi: 10.6028/NIST.IR.8062 
 
[4] Caitlin Fairchild, “Pentagon to examine fitness trackers post-Strava,” Nextgov, 
Jan. 30, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.nextgov.com/analytics-
data/2018/01/pentagon-examine-fitness-trackers-post-strava/145591/ 
 
[5] Office of Personnel Management, “Cybersecurity incidents,” Accessed November 
8, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-
incidents/  
 
[6] Joint Task Force Interagency Working Group, “Security and Privacy Controls for 
Information Systems and Organizations,” National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, 2020. [Online]. doi: 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5 
 
[7] SAM.gov, “COVID-19: Proximity tracking program,” Jul. 08, 2020. [Online.] 
Available: https://beta.sam.gov/opp/806be5faa3bb4d51b6b9a25dcb16f9ab/view  
 
[8] “Timeline: Theodore Roosevelt COVID-19 outbreak investigation,” USNI News, 
Jun. 23, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://news.usni.org/2020/06/23/timeline-
theodore-roosevelt-covid-19-outbreak-investigation. 
 
[9] Department of the Navy, “Department of the Navy Strategy for Data and 
Analytics Optimization,” Washington, DC, USA, 2017. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.doncio.navy.mil/ContentView.aspx?id=9475 
 
[10] Department of the Navy, “Department of the Navy Information Superiority 




[11] Kimberly Underwood, “The Navy takes the helm in data management,” SIGNAL 
Magazine, Jan. 27, 2020. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.afcea.org/content/navy-takes-helm-data-management 
 
[12] Department of the Navy Chief Information Officer, “Jupiter: bringing the power 
of data analytics to the DON,” CHIPS, July-September 2020. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.doncio.navy.mil/chips/ArticleDetails.aspx?ID=13804 
 
[13] David Carroll, “Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning for COVID Fleet 
Readiness,” presented at the AI/ML Coalition of the Willing, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Nov. 06, 2020. 
 
[14] Executive Office of the President, “Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving 




[15] President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, “Big Data and 




[16] 113th Congress, Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014. 2014, 
p. 16. [Online]. Available: https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ283/PLAW-
113publ283.pdf 
 
[17] Circular No. A-130, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC, USA, 




[18] Executive Office of the President, “Fiscal year 2019–2020 Guidance on Federal 
Information Security and Privacy Management Requirements,” Washington, DC, 
USA, 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/M-20-04.pdf 
 
[19] Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, “Risk Management Framework for 
Information Systems and Organizations: A System Life Cycle Approach for 
Security and Privacy,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, 




[20] National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Framework for Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.1,” National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, NIST CSWP 04162018, 2018. [Online]. doi: 
10.6028/NIST.CSWP.04162018 
 
[21] Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DOD Information Technology (IT), 





[22] National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Roadmap for Advancing the 
NIST Privacy Framework: A Tool for Improving Privacy through Enterprise Risk 
Management,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, 




[23] DOD Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs, DOD Instruction 5400.11, 
Department of Defense, Washington, DC, USA, 2019. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/540011p.pdf 
 




[25] Department of the Navy Privacy Program, Secretary of the Navy Instruction 
5211.5F, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, USA, 2019. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.doncio.navy.mil/ContentView.aspx?id=799 
 
[26] DHA Privacy and Civil Liberties Office, “DHA Privacy Program Plan.” Defense 
Health Agency, Falls Church, VA, USA, 2019. [Online]. Available: 
https://health.mil/Military-Health-Topics/Privacy-and-Civil-Liberties 
 
[27] Committee on National Security Systems, “Security Categorization and Control 




[28] L. Ferretti et al., “Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic 
control with digital contact tracing,” Science, vol. 368, no. 6491, May 2020. 
[Online]. doi: 10.1126/science.abb6936. 
 
[29] S. Vaudenay, “Analysis of DP3T: between Scylla and Charybdis,” Apr. 2020. 
[Online]. Available: http://eprint.iacr.org/2020/399 
124 
[30] S. Vaudenay, “Centralized or decentralized? The contact tracing dilemma,” May 
2020. [Online]. Available: http://eprint.iacr.org/2020/531 
 
[31] Dave Muoio, “Apple, Google’s contact tracing update streamlines user 
enrollment, asks less of public health developers,” MobiHealthNews, September 




[32] Bobbie Johnson, “Some prominent exposure apps are slowly rolling back 




[33] J. Bay et al., “BlueTrace: A privacy-preserving protocol for community-driven 
contact tracing across borders,” Government Technology Agency, Singapore, 
2020. [Online]. Available: https://bluetrace.io/static/bluetrace_whitepaper-
938063656596c104632def383eb33b3c.pdf 
 
[34] M. R. Hussein, A. B. Shams, E. H. Apu, K. A. A. Mamun, and M. S. Rahman, 
“Digital surveillance systems for tracing COVID-19: privacy and security 
challenges with recommendations,” submitted to ICAICT 2020, Bangladesh, Jun. 
30, 2020. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/2007.13182 
 
[35] P. H. Kindt, T. Chakraborty, and S. Chakraborty, “How reliable is smartphone-
based electronic contact tracing for COVID-19?,” May 12, 2020. [Online]. 
Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/2005.05625 
 
[36] Y. Lee, “Singapore rules out Apple, Google’s contact-tracing system,” Bloomberg 
Law, Jun. 16, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-
and-telecom-law/singapore-rules-out-using-apple-google-contact-tracing-system 
 
[37] J. Abeler, M. Bäcker, U. Buermeyer, and H. Zillessen, “COVID-19 contact 
tracing and data protection can go together,” JMIR Mhealth Uhealth, vol. 8, no. 4, 
p. e19359, Apr. 2020. [Online]. doi: 10.2196/19359 
 
[38] N. Eagle and A. Pentland, “Reality mining: Sensing complex social systems,” 
Pers Ubiquit Comput, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 255–268, May 2006. [Online]. doi: 
10.1007/s00779-005-0046-3 
 
[39] DON Privacy Team, “Rules for handling PII by DON contractor support 
personnel,” Department of the Navy Chief Information Officer, Aug. 29, 2018. 
[Online]. Available: https://www.doncio.navy.mil/ContentView.aspx?id=10719 
125 
[40] Y. Sun, J. Zhang, Y. Xiong, and G. Zhu, “Data security and privacy in cloud 
computing,” International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, vol. 10, no. 7, 
p. 190903, Jul. 2014. [Online]. doi: 10.1155/2014/190903 
 
[41] H. Takabi, J. B. D. Joshi, and G.-J. Ahn, “Security and privacy challenges in 
cloud computing environments,” IEEE Security Privacy, vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 24–31, 
Nov. 2010. [Online]. doi: 10.1109/MSP.2010.186 
 
[42] G. D’Acquisto, J. Domingo-Ferrer, P. Kikiras, V. Torra, Y.-A. de Montjoye, and 
A. Bourka, “Privacy by design in big data: An overview of privacy enhancing 
technologies in the era of big data analytics,”European Union Agency for 
Network and Information Security, Heraklion, Greece, 2015. [Online]. doi: 
10.2824/641480 
 
[43] S. L. Garfinkel, “De-identification of Personal Information,” National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
Gaithersburg, MD, NIST IR 8053, 2015. doi: 10.6028/NIST.IR.8053 
 
[44] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “Robust de-anonymization of large sparse 
datasets,” in 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008), Oakland, 
CA, USA, May 2008, pp. 111–125. [Online]. doi: 10.1109/SP.2008.33 
 
[45] Y.-A. de Montjoye, C. A. Hidalgo, M. Verleysen, and V. D. Blondel, “Unique in 
the crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility,” Sci Rep, vol. 3, Mar. 2013. 
[Online]. doi: 10.1038/srep01376 
 
[46] N. Shevchenko, T. A. Chick, P. O’Riordan, T. P. Scanlon, and C. Woody, “Threat 
Modeling: A Summary of Available Methods.” Carnegie Mellon University 
Software Engineering Institute, Pittsburg, PA, 2018. [Online]. Available: 
https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/WhitePaper/2018_019_001_524597.pdf 
 
[47] LINDDUN, “LINDDUN Privacy Engineering.” Accessed February 14, 2021. 
[Online]. Available: https://www.linddun.org 
 
[48] A. Gholami and E. Laure, “Advanced cloud privacy threat modeling,” Computer 
Science & Information Technology ( CS & IT ), pp. 229–239, Jan. 2016. [Online]. 
doi: 10.5121/csit.2016.60120. 
 
[49] M. Kayaalp, “Modes of de-identification,” AMIA Annu Symp Proc, vol. 2017, pp. 





[50] S. L. Garfinkel, “De-Identifying Government Datasets,” National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, NIST Special Publication 





[51] M. Hintze, “Viewing the GDPR through a de-Identification lens: A tool for 
clarification and compliance,” SSRN Journal, 2016. [Online]. doi: 
10.2139/ssrn.2909121 
 
[52] L. Rocher, J. M. Hendrickx, and Y.-A. de Montjoye, “Estimating the success of 
re-identifications in incomplete datasets using generative models,” Nature 
Communications, vol. 10, no. 1, Art. no. 1, Jul. 2019. [Online]. doi: 
10.1038/s41467-019-10933-3 
 
[53] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services , “Methods for de-identification 
of PHI,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC, USA, 
2012. [Online]. Available: https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html 
 
[54] J. S. Hiller and R. S. Russell, “Privacy in crises: The NIST privacy framework,” 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 31–38, 2017. 
[Online]. doi: 10.1111/1468-5973.12143 
 
[55] Issie Lapowsky, “How cambridge analytica sparked the great privacy 
awakening,” Wired, March 17, 2019. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.wired.com/story/cambridge-analytica-facebook-privacy-awakening/ 
 
[56] J. A. Kroll, N. Kohli, and P. Laskowski “Privacy and policy in polystores: A data 
management research agenda,” LNCS: Heterogeneous Data Management, 
Polystores, and Analytics for Healthcare, vol. 11721, no. 1, Aug. 2019. [Online]. 
Available: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1rq8m88w 
 
[57] International Organization for Standardization, “ISO/IEC 27701:2019,” ISO.org. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.iso.org/standard/71670.html 
 
[58] PEPP-PT, “PEPP-PT.org.” Accessed Septemer 28, 2020. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.pepp-pt.org 
 






[60] “Building Blocks for Pandemic Management Systems Using Proximity Tracing,” 
PEPP-PT, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/pepp-pt/pepp-pt-
documentation/blob/master/PEPP-PT-building-blocks.pdf
[61] “Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing.” The DP-3T Project, May 
25, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/DP-
3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20White%20Paper.pdf
[62] F. Aisec, “Pandemic contact tracing apps: DP-3T, PEPP-PT NTK, and ROBERT 
from a privacy perspective,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Reprot 202/489, 2020.
[Online]. Available: http://eprint.iacr.org/2020/489
[63] “Security and Privacy Analysis of the Document ‘PEPP-PT: Data Protection and 





[64] “Security and Privacy Analysis of the Document ‘ROBERT: ROBust and privacy-




[65] “Data Protection and Information Security Architecture: Illustrated on German 
Implementation.” PEPP-PT, Apr. 20, 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://github.com/pepp-pt/pepp-pt-documentation/blob/master/10-data-protection/
PEPP-PT-data-protection-information-security-architecture-Germany.pdf
[66] R. L. Rivest, D. J. Weitzner, L. C. Ivers, I. Soibelman, and M. A. Zissman,
“PACT: Private Automated Contact Tracing Mission and Approach,” PACT, 
Cambridge, MA, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://pact.mit.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/PACT-Mission-and-Approach-2020-05-19-.pdf
[67] Rivest et al., “The PACT Protocol Specification,” PACT, Cambridge, MA, 2020.
[Online]. Available: https://pact.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/The-PACT-
protocol-specification-ver-0.1.pdf









[70] H. Cho, D. Ippolito, and Y. W. Yu, “Contact tracing mobile apps for COVID-19: 
Privacy considerations and related trade-offs,” arXiv:2003.11511 [cs], Mar. 2020. 
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/2003.11511 
 
[71] National Institute of Standards and Technology, “NIST Privacy Framework and 
Cybersecurity Framework to NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5 
Crosswalk,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
